

INQUEST INTO 6 DEATHS IN THE 1998 SYDNEY TO HOBART YACHT RACE

STATEMENT OF ALAN GREEN

I, Alan Green of Elm Lodge, Elm Road, New Malden, Surrey, United Kingdom, Independent Consultant on Off-Shore Race Management say:

Background

1. I have had a life long interest in sailing. I joined the Royal Ocean Racing Club of the United Kingdom as an ordinary member in 1963. I have raced off-shore for over 30 years and have logged literally thousands of miles in off-shore racing. Generally I have sailed as a skipper/navigator on the yachts in which I competed. Amongst other off-shore racing I have sailed in the Fastnet Race and in the 1977/78 Whitbread Round The World Race I sailed the Auckland to Rio leg around Cape Horn.
2. For some 30 years up until January 2000, I was a staff member of the Royal Ocean Racing Club. My term with the Royal Ocean Racing Club has included 12 years as secretary of that organisation and 30 years effectively as Director of Racing and Special Events. I was responsible for the organisation and management of up to 20 off-shore events each year including every second year the Fastnet Race (it being a biennial race) and other long distance races in excess of 150 nautical miles. In 1968 I created and skippered in the Middle Sea Race. This race of some 600 miles around the islands in the central Mediterranean is now held annually.
3. I am currently an independent consultant in off-shore race management. My clients include Volvo in relation the Volvo Round The World Ocean Race, the successor to the Whitbread Race - and The Challenge Business which entity runs the BT Global Challenge Race and other events. The BT Global Challenge Race is run with essentially amateur crews in near identical boats around the world "the wrong way"; that is to say, from east to west against the prevailing winds. I have served and continue to serve on the committees of both the Whitbread Race (as it then was) and the British Steel Challenge (as the BT Global Challenge was first known) since their inceptions in 1973 and 1992 respectively.

4. I am Chairman of the Special Regulations Committee of the Off-Shore Racing Council and have been Chairman of the Special Regulations Committee of the Royal Ocean Racing Club for the past 10 years.

The Fastnet Race 1979

5. I took up my appointment as secretary of the Royal Ocean Racing Club in 1979, just before the 1979 Fastnet Race was sailed. I was in charge of running all aspects of that race, being responsible to the Flag Officers and Committee. I ran the race headquarters for the duration of the event and acted as media spokesman for the Royal Ocean Racing Club giving 2 open press conferences each day for the duration of the event after the fleet ran into trouble in a violent storm.
6. My job in effect as Race Director of the Fastnet Race was broadly similar, in my understanding, to the responsibilities of the Race Director for the Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race. My team at the Royal Ocean Racing Club was responsible for receiving the entries, putting together sailing instructions and like administrative functions. We finished the boats at the end of the race taking details of time of finish, produced race results and generally acting as an information exchange. To that end we had a press office running for us. The press office for the 1979 Fastnet Race was essentially paid for by and initially set up for the sponsors of the Admirals Cup event of which the Fastnet Race is the final race. By prior arrangement the resources of the press office were diverted to support a full coverage of the Fastnet Race when that became necessary.
7. As events transpired in the 1979 Fastnet Race the news coverage of the Admirals Cup became peripheral and the resources of the press office and of the media centre staff were directed towards looking after coverage of the multiple Fastnet incidents.
8. When the storm struck the 1979 Fastnet Race fleet my colleagues and I re-organised the way the press office worked and set up a system whereby the manager of the press office would release factual information as soon as it was known and as soon as we were confident that the information was accurate. For example we would have released details of yachts which had reached safe harbour. We did not release information relating to serious death or injury until this had been thoroughly checked and, in the case of fatalities, next-of-kin informed. If there was an issue of a sensitive nature or which dealt with race rules or policy, responses to the press were made in

one of the twice-daily press conferences at which I acted as media spokesman. Having one spokesman ensured continuity of response. The fundamentals of our media policy were to be open and honest.

9. Subsequent to the tragedies of the 1979 Fastnet Race an inquiry was set up jointly by the Royal Yachting Association and the Royal Ocean Racing Club. The inquiry was under my administrative direction and I took part in it as one of the central team members working for Colonel James Myatt, Sir Hugh Forbes QC and Sir Maurice Laing representing the Royal Yachting Association and the Royal Ocean Racing Club.
10. During the course of our inquiry we sent a detailed questionnaire to all boats taking part in the race and we got responses to a high proportion of those questionnaires. I am informed and it seems self-evident that the form of questionnaire used by our inquiry was adopted and used by the CYCA in its enquiry into the 1998 Sydney – Hobart disaster.
11. During the course of the inquiry we conducted many interviews with weather and other experts.
12. The Fastnet Race Inquiry Report was published in December 1979, the race having been conducted in August of that year.

Rescue Services

13. The Coast Guard in the United Kingdom is the coordinating Search and Rescue authority for maritime rescue. Prior to the 1979 Fastnet Race (and indeed prior to subsequent Fastnet Races) no special action was taken in respect to search and rescue beyond informing the Coast Guard of the fact that the race was about to take place. The only rescue resources available in the 1979 Fastnet Race which were pre-planned beyond alerting the Search and Rescue authorities of the fact of the race was that in that year we provided a motor sailer known as “Morningtown” as a communications relay vessel and in addition a Netherlands warship “Overijssel” was in attendance, fundamentally to add stature to the event. It was appreciated that if things went wrong both these vessels would be available to assist in search, rescue and communication, as indeed they did.
14. Search and rescue facilities (quite apart from anything to do with ocean racing) are well developed in the United Kingdom. The Royal National Life Boat Institution (“RNLI”) operates around the United Kingdom including the south coast of England

and in southern Ireland. The RNLI maintains a network of fast, all-weather craft. In addition the Royal Navy has a search and rescue facility at their air station "Culdrose" in Cornwall. In fact the major and most effective facility in search and rescue for the 1979 Fastnet Race was the helicopter teams supported though they were by the RNLI and by "Overijssel" and "Morningtown".

Communications

15. In 1979 there was no tradition in English and indeed in European waters of fitting HF or even VHF radio transceivers to yachts. It was not yet common for racing yachts to carry radio communication equipment, it was not an official requirement although 66% of vessels in the 1979 Fastnet Race had VHF including the Admiral's Cup fleet for whom it was compulsory. This situation was quite dissimilar to the situation in the Sydney to Hobart Race which, as I understand, has a history of organised radio communication dating back for more than 30 years.
16. In the wake of the 1979 Fastnet Race it became clear that VHF radio telephones on competing yachts had the capacity to be of considerable assistance. The requirement to carry VHF radio telephones was an implicit recommendation of the Fastnet Inquiry Committee. Some 2 or 3 years after the 1979 Fastnet Race all ocean racing yachts in the United Kingdom were required to carry VHF radio telephones. HF radios are not required in England or in Europe.
17. There was no requirement in the Fastnet Race even up to and including the present day for compulsory communications skeds to be held during the course of the race except for the Admiral's Cup fleet. In fact in the United Kingdom the VHF Coast Radio Station Service has virtually gone. The Service collapsed in the face of mobile telephones and Satcom. In the 1999 Fastnet Race we resorted to encouraging yachtsmen to use mobile phones to report as they were passing various headlands. The Fastnet Race did not have and does not have the comprehensive radio reporting system that the Sydney to Hobart Race has.
18. My observation is that the Sydney to Hobart Race upholds and in some respects exceeds accepted international standards in a Category 1 race. For example the provision of Satcom "C" for each yacht in the 1999 Sydney – Hobart Race is a world first for a Category 1 ocean race of its size.

Weather

19. The Royal Ocean Racing Club has never adopted the role of provider of weather information in respect to ocean racing. The Royal Ocean Racing Club has almost never had any formal weather briefings before the start of the Fastnet Race or any other ocean race. Prior to the start of the Fastnet Race copies of the latest forecast from the weather centre are likely to be available but they are made available in the race offices as a matter of general helpfulness – just as you might get copies of a newspaper in a hotel.
20. Notwithstanding the fact that our approach to the availability of weather forecasts to the fleet may seem casual by Sydney Hobart Race standards in fact the situation is quite different. All yachts have a radio receiver on board with which they can pick up normal commercial radio broadcasts. The BBC regularly broadcasts a shipping weather forecast. In my experience BBC weather forecasts are given a lot of respect by English and European ocean racers. Most of them listen to the BBC which in addition to shipping forecasts gives synoptic weather and coastal station reports as well as detailed forecasts for all maritime areas around western Europe.
21. There are many more weather stations around Europe and across the Atlantic than are available around Australia and it appears to me that the BBC weather forecasting service may therefore be more detailed than is available in Australia.
22. The Fastnet fleet is well versed in the BBC weather forecasting facilities. The BBC forecasts talk both in terms of strong wind warnings, gale warnings and storm warnings and wind strengths but generally also and in the same forecast refers to predictions by reference to the Beaufort Scale. The Beaufort Scale is widely used in weather forecasts in Europe and England.
23. The weather forecast services throughout the United Kingdom and Europe are many and well understood by yachtsmen. Weather forecasts are regularly broadcast on VHF radio, BBC, through the internet, and through cellnet and Satcom C.
24. In my opinion it is not the responsibility of the organising authority of an ocean race to provide weather broadcasts. I support the concept that where the regular services are not up to European or US standard then it maybe reasonable for the organising authority to do all it can to bolster weather broadcast services. This should be done in

concert with the regular weather service. I see that as a voluntary enhancement, not as a mandatory requirement.

Start and Abandonment

25. It has happened that at or just prior to the start of a Fastnet or other long ocean race in the United Kingdom we have been aware that severe weather is likely. In such circumstances the Royal Ocean Racing Club has broadcast the latest available weather over VHF radio and reminded skippers on very rare occasions in terms to the effect that, "The race is scheduled to start on time but skippers are reminded of their responsibilities, we pass on to you the latest severe weather forecast from the weather centre and accordingly skippers should take due notice of weather conditions in making their decision whether or not to start in the race.". Once a race is under way however we do not attempt to disseminate weather largely because of the excellence of the general weather broadcasting services. The BBC for example not only passes on severe weather warnings but will interrupt its regular programs to do so if the weather is particularly severe.
26. Because we do not have the system of scheduled radio communication abandoning a race after it has started is a practical impossibility for us. I do not believe any Fastnet Race has been delayed due to weather at the start other than for short delay periods due to lack of wind. We do have a formal starting policy which we reviewed and stated publicly after the 1979 Fastnet Race Inquiry. The policy is published in the RORC Year Book under '2 Responsibility' and says:

"(d) The Race Committee will make starting signals unless in their opinion it is manifestly unsafe for any of the yachts entered to remain in the vicinity of the starting line. Each yacht shall exercise her responsibility under RRS Fundamental Rule 4 and decide whether or not to start or to continue to race."

In practical terms the policy means that if, for example, there is a Committee Boat starting line and the Committee Boats are unable to hold station then patently we are unable to start the race. Another reason for postponement may be if the Race Officer or Race Committee at the start judge that the conditions are so difficult because of very heavy weather that there is a risk of boats colliding in a confined starting area then the Committee is authorised to postpone the start until conditions are in their judgment safe. The policy does not address conditions 10 miles down the race track.

27. Under our Standing Instructions if it was known, for example, a 65 knot front was going to hit the fleet then we would make the starting signals. At the same time the Committee would broadcast a warning to the fleet advising it of the forecast conditions and reminding the skippers in the fleet that if they felt the slightest doubt about their vessel's ability to handle the forecast conditions then they should make the appropriate decision. The ultimate decision however would be left up to the individual skippers.

28. I am aware from my own experience and knowledge that very many yachtsmen from all walks of life and from all corners of the globe have given a great deal of attention to the question of whether or not an ocean race should be cancelled because of extreme weather conditions either threatened or actual. It is my belief that this strong consensus of world opinion is reflected clearly in fundamental Rule 4 "A boat is solely responsible for deciding whether or not to start or to continue racing" in the Racing Rules of Sailing. In addition both the ORC Special Regulations and the Royal Ocean Racing Club Year Book put the onus very clearly on to the skipper of the boat. There is no doubt that the question of abandonment is difficult and not capable of simple, certain answer. It is my belief that in deciding about the conduct of races organisations such as the Royal Ocean Racing Club and the Cruising Yacht of Australia need to consider their situation in a very wide context. Boats which ocean race around the world are technically regarded as ocean going cruiser racers and in such boats and indeed less capable boats, individuals will traverse the oceans of the world. People mid-ocean inevitably have to make their own decisions when faced with severe weather. I believe that this wider context needs to be considered when reviewing the operational practices of organisations such as the Royal Ocean Racing Club and the Cruising Yacht Club of Australia because if such clubs set a limit of, for example, 60 knots wind speed then there is a risk that vessels would be built down to that limit and have a reduced capacity for survival when, inevitably, they are caught out in more extreme conditions.

29. I find it difficult to imagine a scenario appropriate for the abandonment of an ocean race. Whilst acknowledging the difficult counter-balancing arguments I believe that the abandonment of a race once it has started is something which should remain the responsibility of the people sailing the boats.

30. In my experience there is no evidence to support the proposition that ocean racing skippers press on regardless of weather conditions. It is my belief that people at sea

tend to behave responsibly and put a seamanlike concern for the safety of the vessel before competition.

31. The ORC has no formal policy on race abandonment and my own view is that such a policy would be extremely difficult to formulate.

The Offshore Racing Council

32. The ORC was created in 1969 to co-ordinate an offshore handicap rating rule and special regulations on an international basis.
33. The ORC was established independently from the IYRU. The ORC is recognised by ISAF and is expected to have a closer relationship in the near future.
34. By virtue of my involvement in long-distance offshore racing I am a member of the ISAF's recently established Oceanic Committee.
35. The ORC and ISAF meet annually in November in different parts of the world.
36. The ORC is made up from delegates from all member countries interested in Ocean Racing.
37. There are currently 32 national delegations to the ORC from around the world. A list of ORC member countries is annexed and marked "A".
38. Taking Australia as a typical example my understanding is that Clubs involved in Ocean Racing such as the Cruising Yacht Club of Australia lobby their local yachting authority – in the Cruising Yacht Club's case the Offshore Committee of the Yachting Association of New South Wales in respect of matters they want to bring to the ORC's attention.
39. The peak authority for each country – which in Australia's case is the Australian Yachting Federation – receives submissions from its State bodies, selects its delegate and directs that delegate on what issues are to be put and what stances are to be taken in respect to ORC Annual Meetings. That is to say the ORC considers issues submitted by countries not by individuals as such.

40. The ORC promulgates Special Regulations which are used internationally and translated into French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Japanese, Dutch, German and other languages.
41. The ORC can issue new or amended Special Regulations to come into force after each annual November meeting. In practice, except in matters of immediate importance, the Council tries to issue Special Regulations every two years.
42. The ORC received the 1979 Fastnet Report and subsequently the Sydney to Hobart Race Review Report. The ORC has responded to those reports accordingly.
 - (1) In my opinion one of the major lessons from the Fastnet tragedies was that crew should in most circumstances stay with a vessel believed likely to sink until the last moment if entering a life raft is the alternative. Experience from 1979 demonstrated that early abandonment can lead to unnecessary fatalities. This lesson however re-enforces one of the problems the ORC faces in regulating ocean racing and no doubt like activities suffer similar problems. Whilst lessons from experience are learnt and applied it can be difficult or impossible to apply those lessons by regulation. Only the people involved at the time can assess all factors and make the appropriate decision. For reasons like this the ORC would be loath to see reduced the emphasis placed on Fundamental Rule 4 of the RRS in ocean racing.
 - (2) As to the Sydney to Hobart Race Review Report: The 1999 ORC Annual Meeting was held in Sydney. The Sydney to Hobart Race Review Report was again considered and discussed at that meeting. Amongst other things, the meeting invited and heard from Mr Hugo van Kretschmar who addressed us for some 45 minutes on the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Race.

In addition delegates took back from the meeting the recommendations to their respective national authorities for early implementation of recommendations where those authorities saw fit.
 - (3) Similarly the report and recommendations of this Coronial Inquest will be placed before the ORC for action and appropriate implementation.
 - (4) The ORC has commissioned Mr David Lyons, an Australian Naval Architect who is on the ORC's International Technical Committee to investigate and report on the adequacy of deck structures in ocean racing yachts as this became an area of concern after the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Race.

Life Rafts

43. There has been a growing need for an authoritative comprehensive standard for leisure life rafts for some years. Whilst Category 0 life rafts are considerably more sophisticated than the life rafts required for Category 1 it is the position of the Off-Shore Racing Council that Category 0 life rafts would be excessive in lesser categories. Nonetheless the current lack of uniform detailed control in Category 1 life rafts is recognised. The Off-Shore Racing Council has in the last 2 years increased pressure on the International Standards Organisation for the completion of a long-discussed draft standard for recreational life rafts. The Off-Shore Racing Council is repeatedly left with the impression that the new standard is "about to be delivered" and at last a new detailed draft was published in June 2000. In the meantime, the ORC has maintained its own standard (Appendix A in Special Regulations) pending the issue of a final ISO standard. The indications I have are that the new International Standard for Recreational Life Rafts for Category 1 events will require a life raft that broadly represents the better rafts in current good manufacturing practice. To my mind if the new International Standard is implemented as indicated then that would be a sensible outcome.
44. In my opinion the Solas life raft which is the commercial shipping specification does not meet the needs of off-shore racing boats. Life rafts built to Solas standards are undoubtedly excellent life rafts but there are a number of features not necessarily appropriate in a leisure life raft; eg heavy weight and bulk, and the ability to withstand a drop test as from a ship's deck.

Education

45. As a result of the Cruising Yacht Club of Australia's experience with the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race and as a direct result of its 1998 Sydney to Hobart Race Report the ORC published in its new book of January 2000, a new section – Section 6 – Training – and on page 16 we list topics in which we say that the skipper and at least 30% of the crew must have had training. This concept was introduced as soon as the ORC had received the Sydney - Hobart Race Review Report and it was agreed that the idea of training should be given its fullest support.
46. A proper training syllabus is yet to be developed but it is being looked at. At least the principle of training has been nurtured and accepted by the International Yacht Racing community. As a result of the Sydney to Hobart Race experiences, for example, the Round Britain and Ireland Race in August 2000 requires training and I am personally aware that skippers and crews have gone out and specially undertaken training which they would not have otherwise done. I am also aware that other countries, including the USA and in Latin America, are taking the requirements for training very seriously and looking to develop appropriate training schemes.
47. The ORC depends substantially on volunteers and it is a large task to coordinate details of particular training courses in order to establish international syllabuses and bench marks. Whilst this is an objective of the ORC the short term development of the detail of training schemes has to be through local efforts. The ORC draws its strength from the contributions of its national authority members and their communities.

Safety Checks

48. It is my understanding that prior to the Sydney to Hobart Race safety inspectors check every entrant. Attitudes towards safety checks vary from race to race and from country to country. In my experience however the Sydney to Hobart Race has a system of checking which is stringent well beyond the norm. The Royal Ocean Racing Club does not do a full check of all yachts except in some events most notably including the BT Global Challenge and Volvo Round The World Races where every yacht is checked. The Royal Ocean Racing Club's practice is to warn people that there will be random checks of safety equipment and then to carry them out. In some areas of Europe for some off-shore races there are few checks and the principle is

self-policing; that is to say, organising authorities rely on competitors protesting each other if there is a perceived deficiency in safety equipment. Again, it is a matter for individual yachts to take full responsibility for their own affairs.

49. A number of long and many short, ocean races are conducted in the United States of America including the Bermuda Race (of similar length and history to the Fastnet and Hobart races), the Annapolis – Newport and the Los Angeles – Honolulu (“Transpac”) races. The races generally (although not always) have milder weather than the Sydney to Hobart. The Americans keenly support ORC Special Regulations and promote their use by racing and cruising sailors.

Safety Harness

50. I understand that various problems arose with safety harness clips under the practical conditions in the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Race. The design of clips is not an issue which has received recent attention from the Ocean Racing Council as the Council was under the impression that clips were adequate. Plainly this impression is not accurate. However the clip making industry is well developed with like clips being used in ocean racing, mountaineering and in various industrial applications. I have no reason to believe other than that the industry would be responsive if improvements could be put to it.

Clips and harnesses are the subjects of a recent survey carried out in the USA. It is possible that a submission regarding locking clips may be made to the ORC in November this year.

Crisis Management

51. I am not aware whether or not major ocean races around the world (other than the Fastnet, BT Global Challenge and Volvo Race which I will deal with later) have crisis management plans for their events.
52. As far as the Fastnet Race is concerned we worked on an informal crisis plan prior to 1997.
53. Since (and including) the 1997 Fastnet Race we have had our Crisis Management Plan expressed in writing as a formal document. Annexed hereto and marked “B” is a copy of the Crisis Management Plan for the Fastnet Race.

54. One of the duties that the ORC's Special Regulations Committee has accepted under my chairmanship is to review Crisis Operation Plans to see if we can identify some common features of them for sailing organisations for sailing events like the Fastnet and Sydney to Hobart Race. We have managed to collect Crisis Management Plans from some organisations around the world and it is plain they vary widely. Some appear to have had the benefit of advice from professional management experts and others seem to be completely drawn by amateurs. Some are comprehensive and intended for a relatively wide readership and others are intimate and intended only for half a dozen people. It appears to the Special Regulations Committee that at the moment there is not a good general standard but we are working towards having at least some internationally applicable bases for Crisis Management.
55. In England the Fastnet Race Crisis Management Plan is distributed to the police, the Coast Guard, to the helicopter operators and to town planners because in the case of the latter there are in the United Kingdom Civil Emergency offices under the control of local town planners. Similarly our Crisis Management Plan goes to the RNLI.
56. In the case of the Fastnet Race Crisis Management Plan we give background to the whole organisation and to the race because, possibly unlike the situation with the Sydney to Hobart Race, our plan goes to a number of people not in the ocean racing community or who are uninformed about the nature of offshore racing.
57. In addition in the United Kingdom the country has acquired a new procedure produced by the Home Office under Statute described in their book "Dealing With Disaster". The police in the United Kingdom now have powers to take over certain aspects of disaster management.
58. As a matter of practice when conducting the Fastnet Race we assemble the Race Management Team at Cowes during the week prior to the start and then immediately prior to the start send an advanced party down to the finishing area at Plymouth. A skeleton staff mans the Race Office on a 24 hour basis at Plymouth from before the start and then as soon as the start is clear of the starting line the rest of the team travels immediately, and some times overnight, to Plymouth so that we maintain a full strength base at Plymouth on a 24 hour basis until the last yacht finishes.

Is Category 1 Appropriate for the Sydney to Hobart Race

59. Events are categorised in the Offshore Racing Council's Special Regulations point 2.1. I set out the relevant categories:
- (a) Category 0: Trans-ocean races, where boats must be completely self-sufficient for very extended periods of time, capable of withstanding heavy storms and prepared to meet serious emergencies without the expectation of outside assistance.
 - (b) Category 1: Races of long distance and well offshore, where boats must be self-sufficient for extended periods of time, capable of withstanding heavy storms and prepared to meet serious emergencies without the expectation of outside assistance.
 - (c) Category 2: Races of extended duration along or not far removed from shorelines or in large unprotected bays or lakes, where a high degree of self-sufficiency is required of the boats.
60. I was a member of the Ocean Racing Council (although not then its chairman) when Category 0 was introduced about 20 years ago. Category 0 reflects standards which were required for around the world ocean races which included southern ocean sailing over thousands of miles virtually beyond assistance except perhaps from another yacht.
61. Prior to the introduction of Category 0, Category 1 was the highest level for off-shore races. Whilst the categories are imprecise in definition the Sydney to Hobart Race most nearly fits within Category 2. Notwithstanding that in my opinion having regard to the history of the Sydney to Hobart Race it is appropriate that the Cruising Yacht Club of Australia treat the event as a Category 1 race.
62. Arguably the most notable difference between Category 1 and Category 0 (although by no means the only notable difference) is that in Category 0 water tight bulk heads are required. Whilst I believe water tight bulk heads are a wise feature, in smaller boats (45' and under) it becomes much more difficult sensibly to install them. In addition in the Sydney to Hobart Race you are never going to be more than 150 miles away from shore and so I do not believe that water tight bulk heads are so critically important as to require inclusion in Sydney to Hobart requirements.

63. An immersion suit or survival suit for each crew member is a requirement for Category 0. I believe it would be a sensible line of inquiry to consider whether immersion suits would be an appropriate recommendation for the Sydney to Hobart Race. A well considered proposal would be welcomed by the ORC.

The Future

64. The International Off-Shore Racing community views the deliberations and will view the recommendations of this Inquest with the utmost gravity. The International Yacht Racing community understands and accepts that lessons have been learnt from the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Race as lessons were learnt from the 1979 Fastnet Race. The Ocean Racing Council is cognisant of the fact that further recommendations need to be received and acted upon in an open and constructive manner and is considerably appreciative of the time, trouble and dedication shown by those in Australia who have looked in to the circumstances so thoroughly.

Dated: 19th July ~~July~~ 2000

Alan Green

Alan Green