

## **CORONERS COURT**

### **INQUEST INTO THE DEATHS IN THE 1998 SYDNEY TO HOBART YACHT RACE**

#### **STATEMENT OF PHILLIP THOMPSON**

On 2 July 2000, I, **PHILLIP THOMPSON**, of 43 Benelong Street, Cremorne in the State of New South Wales, Sports Administrator, say:

#### **Background**

1. I have been sailing for over 20 years both onshore and offshore. I have sailed in 15 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Races ("SHYR"), overseas regattas in Hawaii and England and attempted an around the world Whitbread Challenge.
2. I am a qualified A Level 1 Coach. I have also completed the AYF Offshore Instructors Certificate, which entitles me to take sailors offshore and instruct them in offshore sailing.
3. I have been employed by the Cruising Yacht Club of Australia ("CYCA") for over 14 years and since mid 1994 I have been the Sailing Manager of the Sailing Office. Prior to that time, I was the Marina and Site Manager.
4. In my role as Sailing Manager, I am responsible for the marina, slipways, yard and the organisation and conduct of all CYCA races including:
  - (1) Drafting race documentation for the Sailing Committee's approval;
  - (2) Vetting and processing of applications and entries;
  - (3) Pre-race organisation and planning including liaising with authorities and personnel;
  - (4) On and off water management; and
  - (5) Production of results.

I perform the above responsibilities with the assistance of the Sailing Office staff.

5. In 1998 I was a member of the Sailing Committee, SHYR Race Committee and the SHYR Race Management Team (hereinafter referred to as the Race Committee and Race Management Team). I have been a member of the Sailing Committee, Race Committee and Race Management Team since 1994. I have been the Race Director and consequently, the head of the Race Management Team since 1995. In the sixteen years prior to 1994 I sailed in every SHYR except for one.
6. In 1998 I had a very good understanding of ISAF's Racing Rules of Sailing ("RRS"), the prescriptions and special regulations of the AYF and the Notice of Race and Sailing Instructions, which together are the rules under which the SHYR is conducted.
7. Since 1998 I have completed ISAF's race management course and as a result, should qualify as a National Race Officer later this year.

***ISAF's Race Management Manual ("RMM")***

8. Section A of the RMM provides a guide for organising clubs on the organisation and management of races including the responsibilities of the organising club, its committees and key personnel.
9. However, the RMM is written for short offshore regattas with close on-water management not long offshore races such as the SHYR. Consequently, while the RMM provides general direction in relation to the organisation and management of the SHYR, it is largely silent on the manner it should be managed after the start of race.
10. Consequently, over the last 55 years the CYCA has developed its own practice for the organisation and management of the SHYR, which I will outline in the following paragraphs.

**1998 SHYR MANAGEMENT**

***SAILING COMMITTEE***

11. The Sailing Committee is responsible to the CYCA board for the overall conduct and management of the SHYR. However, it delegates the day to day pre-race planning and organisation to the Sailing Office and the race control/management to the Race Committee and more particularly the Race Management Team.

12. Consequently, the Sailing Committee's role in the SHYR is really one of determining the CYCA's policies in relation to the race and overseeing the Sailing Office's preparations by reference to the Sailing Manager's regular reports to the committee throughout the year. It should be noted that the General Manager also oversees the Sailing Office's preparations for the SHYR and liases with the Sailing Manager daily in this regard.
  
13. In the year leading up to the 1998 SHYR the Sailing Committee performed the following tasks:
  - (1) Reviewed the Notice of Race and Sailing Instructions from the preceding year and considered whether any amendments were desirable based on my recommendations as the Sailing Manager/Race Director;
  - (2) Approved the Notice of Race and Sailing Instructions prior to publishing;
  - (3) Reviewed the management and conduct of the 1997 SHYR and considered whether any alterations were desirable based on my recommendations as the Sailing Manager/ Race Director;
  - (4) Implemented the sponsorship arrangements with Telstra;
  - (5) Nominated the Race Committee, Jury and Race Management Team based on my recommendations to the Chairman as the Sailing Manager/ Race Director;
  - (6) Approved the involvement of organisations such as Young Endeavour, AMSA and the Bureau of Meteorology ("BoM") in the on water management of the SHYR; and
  - (7) Considered any other issues which arose throughout the year in relation to the SHYR. For example:
    - (a) The applications for *Sir Thomas Sopworth*, who wanted to enter with a crew of 16 minors and only 2 adults, *Jarkan*, who refused to supply documentation in relation to speed and stability, and *Noumea* a New Caledonian yacht which did not initially comply with the stability requirements;
    - (b) Reports by David Lawson, the CYCA's Chief Safety Officer, in relation to safety aspects of the SHYR; and

(c) Mark Robinson's report on the inclusion of a CHS category.

14. In or about February 1998 the Sailing Committee nominated Hans Sommer (Chairman), Bruce Rowley, Mark Robinson, Howard Elliott, Robert Badenach, David Boyes and myself to be on the Race Committee.
15. At or about that time, the Sailing Committee also nominated Mark Robinson, Howard Elliott and myself as Race Director to be on the Race Management Team. Sam Hughes, the AMSA Liaison Officer, was also treated by the Sailing Committee and Race Management Team as if he was a member of the Race Management Team.

### **SAILING OFFICE**

16. As I noted above, the Sailing Committee delegates the day to day planning of the SHYR to the Sailing Office, which co-ordinates and organises the race up to and including the start when the Race Committee and Race Management Team take over.
17. In 1998 the following members of the Sailing Office staff were involved in the preparations for the SHYR:

#### Myself

As the Sailing Manager, I was responsible to the Sailing Committee and General Manager for the organisation and planning of the SHYR and the Sailing Office staff reported to me.

#### Mark Robinson

Robinson was the Sailing Administrator and CYCA Measurer and as such, assisted me with the organisation of the SHYR. In particular, Robinson had the following responsibilities:

- (1) Advising the Sailing Committee, CYCA members and myself in relation to IMS and CHS compliance, measuring and scoring;
- (2) Reviewing and approving all current IMS and CHS certificates at the time of processing of applications and entries;
- (3) Reviewing and approving maxi yacht applicants with respect to the speed requirement;
- (4) Assisting to chase up yachts in relation to outstanding entry documentation;

- (5) Liasing with Howard Elliott in relation to scoring/results for the race and ensuring all necessary data was organised to enable the production of results after each Sked;
- (6) Liasing with Computerland in relation to the computer network at the RYCT;
- (7) Liasing with Telstra in relation to the Telstra SHYR website;
- (8) Preparation of division lists for the race: and
- (9) Assisting me generally with the organisation and planning for SHYR including handing out briefing kits at the pre-race briefing and laying the starting line for the start of the race.

The previous Sailing Administrator also performed the above tasks although he was not an IMS Measurer and hence, not as qualified to advise the CYCA in relation to IMS compliance. When Robinson was promoted to the position of Sailing Administrator in 1996, I explained his responsibilities to him and the Sailing Office's procedures and then, at the time of the various races, Robinson's role in relation to those particular races including the SHYR.

As far as I am aware since the 1996 SHYR Robinson has performed the above responsibilities. Throughout that period I have had numerous conversations and dealings with Robinson which confirmed that he was in fact performing the above responsibilities competently.

#### Andrea Holt

Holt was the secretarial assistant for the Sailing Office and as such, provided secretarial support to Robinson and myself and assisted with the general organisation of the SHYR including the production of the Notice of Race and Sailing Instructions, processing of applications and entries and maintaining the race files and registers.

#### David Lawson

Lawson was a volunteer and the Chief Safety Inspection Officer for the SHYR. Lawson and his team of inspectors were responsible for conducting the CYCA's safety inspections and reviewing and approving all safety documentation required for the race. Lawson was also available for entrants to discuss any of their queries in relation to the SHYR safety requirements.

18. The Sailing Office's procedures for processing applications and entries are streamlined for all CYCA races. The CYCA conduct 3 major races a year. The Sydney Gold Coast Race, which is held in August, the Pre-Hobart Regatta which is held on 15 to 22 December and the SHYR.
19. In the following paragraphs I have outlined the Sailing Office's involvement in the SHYR between January and 26 December 1998.

***January to Mid 1998 – Review Process and Issue of Notice of Race***

20. In or about January 1998 I reviewed the Notice of Race from the preceding year and drafted any necessary amendments. At that time various people had input into the Notice of Race including Mark Robinson, the Race Committee, RYCT SHYR Committee and certain members of the SHYR Jury.
21. From January to March 1998 I reviewed the overall management and conduct of the 1997 SHYR and considered what changes were desirable for the 1998 race. My review process included meetings with the Sydney members of the Race Committee, the CYCA staff and RYCT SHYR committee and covered issues such as logistics, equipment and facilities, sponsorship and the involvement of authorities/organisations in the on water management of the race.
22. In or about April 1998 I submitted the draft Notice of Race with the suggested amendments to the Sailing Committee for their approval.
23. After the Sailing Committee approved the draft Notice of Race, I arranged for it to be sent to the Race Committee and Jury for their comments prior to it being submitted to the Yachting Association of NSW Racing Rules Committee ("YA of NSW") for their approval.
24. After the Notice of Race was approved by the YA of NSW and any necessary amendments were incorporated, I submitted the final Notice of Race to the Sailing Committee for their approval prior to publishing.
25. At or about that time I reported to the Sailing Committee in relation to suggested changes in the management and conduct of the race.
26. In or about mid 1998 the Notice of Race was distributed to potential entrants including previous SHYR entrants, previous Sydney Gold Coast Race entrants, selected yachts clubs and anyone else who had requested a Notice of Race or made enquiries in relation to the SHYR.

**Mid 1998 to 2 November 1998 – Organisation and Processing of Applications**

27. In mid 1998, with the assistance of the Sailing Office staff, I commenced organising the SHYR including:
- (a) Arranging for Ken Batt to speak at the Pre-Race Briefing and for BoM to provide special race forecasts prior to and throughout the race.
  - (b) Arranging for Sam Hughes, from AMSA, to speak at the Pre-Race Briefing and to advise the Race Management Team throughout the race;
  - (c) Organising all necessary facilities, support vessels and equipment;
  - (d) Co-ordinating and liaising with volunteers and personnel involved in the SHYR including the radio operators on the Radio Relay Vessel ("RRV");
  - (e) Co-ordinating and liaising with authorities and organisations involved in the SHYR such as the Water Police, Royal Volunteer Coastal Patrol and Young Endeavour;
  - (f) Gaining approvals from the necessary authorities in relation to the SHYR such as the Waterways Authority;
  - (g) Reviewing the Sailing Instructions and Radio Instructions from the preceding year and drafting any necessary amendments;
  - (h) Forwarding the Radio Instructions to Michael Brown, one of the radio operators on the RRV, for his review and comments;
  - (i) Gaining approval to the Sailing Instructions and Radio Instructions from YA of NSW and the Sailing Committee prior to publishing;
  - (j) Dealing with entrant enquiries and providing/distributing information in relation to the SHYR;
  - (k) Organising the launch of the SHYR in October 1998 and other events relating to the race;
  - (l) Arranging the Pre Race Briefing including the SHYR Briefing Kits;
  - (m) Organising the start of the SHYR; and

(n) Liaising with the RYCT in relation to the berthing in Hobart, the Race Control Centre ("RCC"), Telephone Information Centre, Radio Room, Race Information Centre and other necessary facilities.

28. Throughout this period I regularly reported to the Sailing Committee in relation to the above preparations and referred to the Sailing Committee any issues warranting its attention and determination. I also reported to Rowley in his role as General Manager on a daily basis.

29. The Notice of Race required applications for entry for the SHYR ("Applications") to be submitted to the CYCA by 2 November 1998. Consequently, between July and November 1998, Applications were returned to the Sailing Office. Applications were received over the Sailing Office counter, by facsimile or by mail. All Applications received by the Sailing Office were put on either my desk or Holt's desk.

30. All Applications received by the Sailing Office were reviewed and vetted by me. I note that Holt looked over the Applications that were put on her desk and if she thought the applicant's stability and offshore experience appeared to comply with the Notice of Race, she would write "OK Gus" ("Gus" is her nickname) in the top right hand corner of the Application and place it on my desk. Notwithstanding Holt's preliminary check, in 1998 I personally read all the Applications and checked that they complied with the Notice of Race.

31. When I read the Applications, I checked the following:

- (1) The nominated crew and their offshore experience;
- (2) That the yacht complied with the length requirements;
- (3) If the yacht was of an age that it required ABS approved plans and if so, that satisfactory documentation was included in this regard;
- (4) If the applicant wished to enter the IMS category, that a current valid IMS certificate was included which showed the yacht had a limit of positive stability or minimum stability index of greater than 115 degrees or would comply with the grandfathering clause.

Some Applications noted that the Sailing Office held a current IMS certificate on file, in which case I checked that the IMS folder contained that certificate and that it complied with the stability requirement.



(5) If the applicant wished to enter PHS category that the Application included:

(a) A valid IMS certificate which showed the yacht had a limit of positive stability or minimum stability index of greater than 115 degrees or would comply with the grandfathering clause.

OR

(b) Other acceptable verification of the yacht's stability.

(6) If the applicant wished to enter the CHS Category that the Application included:

(a) A valid current CHS certificate; and

(b) A valid IMS certificate which showed the yacht had a limit of positive stability or minimum stability index of greater than 115 degrees or would comply with the grandfathering clause;

OR

(c) Other acceptable verification of the yacht's stability.

(7) If the applicant was a maxi yacht and if so, I asked Robinson to review the IMS certificate (whether it was current or not) to ensure it complied with the speed requirement.

32. If a yacht wished to enter IMS category and had attached to their Application an IMS certificate which was valid but not current, I still approved the Application as current certificates were frequently unavailable when yachts submitted their Applications. However, yachts falling into this category were only eligible to race PHS unless they submitted a valid current certificate, which was required to be submitted by 5.00pm 22 December 1998.

33. Similarly, if a yacht wished to enter CHS category and had not included with their Application a valid current CHS certificate, I still approved the Application. However, those yachts were only eligible to race PHS or IMS (if they had supplied a valid current IMS certificate) unless they submitted a valid current CHS certificate by 5.00pm 22 December 1998.

34. After I approved Applications, Holt filed the approved Applications in alphabetical order in the Applications Folder. At that time, Holt filed all supporting documentation which was submitted with the Application in the Applications Folder except for current IMS and CHS certificates. Current IMS and CHS certificates were put on Robinson's desk for his review, approval and filing in the IMS Folder, which contained all current IMS and CHS certificates in alphabetical order.
35. Notwithstanding my practise of personally checking current IMS certificates at the Application stage, as current IMS certificates were put on Robinson's desk, it was the Sailing Office practise that Robinson would review them to ensure they complied with the stability and speed requirements. If Robinson was of the view that an IMS certificate did not comply with those requirements, he would advise me immediately so that I would not process that Application.
36. Any Applications which were contentious or that I otherwise needed some direction in relation to, I referred to the Sailing Committee for their consideration. To the best of my recollection, I referred three Applications to the Sailing Committee in 1998.
37. If an Application was submitted which did not attach all the required documentation, I telephoned or wrote to the applicant and asked them to submit the outstanding documentation so that I could assess their Application. Alternatively, I instructed one of my staff to do so. In particular, any yachts that wished to enter IMS and had not submitted a current certificate, I telephoned and advised them that they were only eligible to race PHS until such time as they submitted a valid current certificate.

***2 November 1998 to 24 December 1998 – Entry Forms and Organisation of SHYR***

38. After the close of Applications on 2 November 1998, Holt compiled a list of the accepted Applications and arranged for those applicants to be sent an Entry Form under the cover of the CYCA's precedent cover letter, which I signed. Attached and marked "A" is a true copy of the CYCA's precedent cover letter.
39. The Notice of Race required the Entry Forms to be returned to the Sailing Office by 27 November 1998. At some stage prior to 27 November 1998, Holt made up a chart which listed the yachts that had been sent an Entry Form down the left hand side with a series of columns across the chart for all the SHYR entry requirements ("the 1998 chart"). The 1998 chart was put up on the wall in the Sailing Office and the columns were to be ticked as each requirement was satisfied. Once a yacht had ticks in all the

columns, the yacht's name was highlighted to indicate that it was eligible to sail in the SHYR.

40. The 1998 chart was put up on the wall in the Sailing Office so that any staff member or yacht owner who came into the Sailing Office could see what documentation was outstanding for a particular yacht.
41. It should be noted that the Certificate column in the 1998 chart was only relevant for IMS and CHS category yachts, which were required to supply a current certificate by 5.00pm on 22 December 1998 to be eligible to race IMS or CHS. This column was necessary because, as I noted above, the Sailing Office had a practise of approving yachts for IMS and CHS categories who had sent a valid but not current certificate with their Application provided a valid current IMS and/or CHS certificate was submitted by 22 December 1998.
42. Entry Forms were received by the Sailing Office in the period leading up to 27 November 1998 either over the Sailing Office counter, by mail or by facsimile. All Entry Forms received by the Sailing Office were put on either my desk or Holt's desk.
43. If an Entry Form was put on Holt's desk, it was my understanding she would read the Entry Form and check if an entry fee, insurance certificate, complete crew list, radio certificate, safety certificate and current IMS or CHS certificate were included. If so, she would:
  - (1) Put a paid stamp on the Entry Form, fill in the fees paid, advertising, class, crew list and insurance columns on the 1998 chart;
  - (2) Put the current IMS or CHS certificate on Robinson's desk for his review, approval and ticking on the 1998 chart; and
  - (3) Put the safety and radio certificates in Lawson's in tray for his review, approval and ticking on the 1998 chart.
44. I dealt with Entry Forms put on my desk as follows. I read the Entry Form and checked if an entry fee, insurance certificate, complete crew list, safety certificate, radio certificate and current IMS or CHS certificate were included. If so:
  - (1) I put a paid stamp on the Entry Form and filled in the fees paid, advertising, class, insurance and crew list columns on the 1998 chart;

- (2) In relation to current IMS and CHS certificates, I either:
    - (a) Checked the certificate myself (except in relation to speed) and then, put it on Robinson's desk for his review, approval and ticking on the 1998 chart; or
    - (b) Put it straight on Robinson's desk for his review, approval and ticking on the 1998 chart. From early December 1998, I usually put the certificates straight on Robinson's desk because by that time I was very busy.
  - (3) I put Radio and Safety Certificates in Lawson's in tray for his review, approval and ticking on the 1998 chart.
45. If an Entry Form was submitted that did not attach all the required entry documentation, Holt, Robinson or I telephoned or wrote to the owner requesting that they submit the outstanding documentation.
46. In the weeks after the close of entries yachts submitted outstanding entry documentation. As that documentation came into the Sailing Office, it was the practise in the Sailing Office for the person who received that documentation to:
- (1) Put safety and radio certificates and any other documentation relating to safety in Lawson's in tray for his review, approval and ticking on the 1998 chart;
  - (2) Put current IMS and CHS certificates on Robinson's desk for his review, approval and ticking on the 1998 chart; and
  - (3) Put entry fees, crew lists and insurance certificates on Holt's desk for her to tick on the 1998 chart and file in the relevant folders.
47. To reduce the risk of errors only certain persons in the Sailing Office were allowed to fill in the different columns in the 1998 chart. Only Holt or I filled in the columns relating to entry fees, advertising, crew lists, class and insurance, only Robinson ticked the certificate column and only Lawson ticked the columns relating to safety. However, if I was standing near the 1998 chart and the person responsible for that column asked me to tick that column for a particular yacht, I would have.

48. It was also common in 1998 for the member of the Sailing Office responsible for a column to go through the relevant folder and another staff member to stand at the 1998 chart while that person read through the folder to ensure all yachts had been ticked who had supplied that documentation. Alternatively, the member of the Sailing Office responsible for a column filed all the approved documentation and then, in or about December 1998 went through the relevant folder with another staff member and ticked off all the yachts that had supplied that documentation in one lot.
49. I cannot recall if Robinson ticked the certificate column as the IMS and CHS certificates came in or if he ticked that column substantially in one lot with help of another staff member.
50. Throughout this period, the Sailing Office continued to organise and plan for the SHYR, which in addition to the matters mentioned above included:
  - (1) Chasing up yachts in relation to outstanding entry documentation. This was done by all members of the Sailing Office;
  - (2) Organising the training session on 13 December 1998 where entrants could learn how life rafts operate and how to deploy EPIRBs. I note that only a few entrants attended that session;
  - (3) Ensuring all data/equipment was organised to enable the production of results after each Sked. Robinson liaised with Howard Elliott in this regard;
  - (4) Co-ordinating and arranging volunteers to man the CYCA Information Shed from 20 December 1998;
  - (5) Arranging for the compilation and publishing of the SHYR program;
  - (6) Preparing the SHYR contact list and distributing it to all staff, committee members, volunteers, organisations and authorities involved in the race; and
  - (7) Arranging for information such as list of entries and Sked sheets to be distributed to various organisations and authorities involved in the SHYR such as Royal Volunteer Coastal Patrol and Volunteer Coast Guard Stations, the Sydney Water Police and Penta Comstat; and
  - (8) Arranging for information such as the Notice of Race, competitors list and crew lists to be distributed to AMSA.

***Business Post Naiad***

51. After I received *Business Post Naiad's* Application, I spoke to Bruce Guy on a number of occasions on the telephone in relation to his yacht. During one of those discussions, we had a conversation to the following effect:

I said: "You'll need a current IMS certificate before you can go IMS otherwise you'll have to go PHS".

He said: "I've got sponsors for the boat and I want to go IMS. I would also like a marina berth that is close to the club. I'll send a current certificate shortly, its being validated".

I said: "Fine. Don't forget its got to be in by 5.00pm 22 December and I'll do what I can about the berth".

52. As far as I can recall, I was not involved in the processing of *Business Post Naiad's* current but invalid IMS certificate. I was not aware of the problems relating to *Business Post Naiad's* IMS certificate until in or about mid February 1999 when Peter Bush asked me to go through all the application and entry documentation as there was a possibility one of the yachts did not comply with the stability requirement. At that time, I checked all the entry documentation and discovered *Business Post Naiad's* current certificate, which was in the IMS Folder and had a stability of less than 110 degrees ("the current certificate"). *Business Post Naiad* was the only yacht which did not comply with the stability requirement for the SHYR.

53. The current certificate does not have a "received" stamp or facsimile markings on it. Hence, it is likely it was received over the Sailing Office counter. As *Business Post Naiad* did not berth at the CYCA marina until after 20 December 1998, I believe that the Sailing Office must have received the current certificate over the counter on or after 20 December 1998 and before 5.00pm on 23 December 1998 (being the day before the Pre-Race Briefing as *Business Post Naiad* was not on the list of yachts with outstanding entry documentation). I cannot offer any explanation as to why the Sailing Office did not detect that the current certificate was invalid. In accordance with the Sailing Office's practice, it should have been placed on Robinson's desk for his review, approval and ticking on the 1998 chart.

54. I have been asked to indicate what would have occurred, if at the time the current certificate was submitted it had been noticed that it was invalid. In those circumstances, the following would have occurred prior to the start of the SHYR:

- (1) I would have advised Bruce Guy that the current certificate was invalid and hence, *Business Post Naiad* was ineligible to race IMS (or PHS) until a current valid certificate was submitted. Furthermore, I would have questioned why there was such a difference between the outdated and current certificate in the yacht's stability and consequently, queried whether the current certificate was correct; and
- (2) I would have suggested the Sailing Office help him arrange, at his cost, to have the yacht remeasured and to see if its stability was different to that shown on the current certificate. If it was still less than 110 degrees, I would have asked a designer what was necessary to get the yacht above 110 degrees, done whatever was necessary and remeasured the yachts again the next morning so that a current valid certificate could be issued prior to the start of the SHYR. This process could have been completed by 5.00pm on 25 December 1998 assuming that the current certificate was submitted at 5.00pm on 23 December 1998.

#### ***Bureau of Meteorology ("BoM")***

55. In the above paragraphs I have briefly outlined the tasks the Sailing Office performed in preparing for the 1998 SHYR. In the following paragraphs I will set out my dealings with BoM leading up to the start of the race.
56. First it is important to emphasise that Ken Batt has been involved in the SHYR and the sailing community generally for many years. Furthermore, he has been speaking at the Pre - Race Briefing for the Telstra Cup and SHYR for approximately the past 8 years and BoM has been providing the weather forecasts for the SHYR over the same period. Consequently, our arrangements with BoM in 1998 were largely based on our relationship and understanding with Ken Batt which had developed over the years, as opposed to any written agreement in relation to the 1998 race.
57. It was my understanding in 1998 that the CYCA paid BoM for special forecasts of the area covered by the SHYR race track for distribution to the fleet and that those forecasts would set out in detail the conditions the fleet would actually experience on the water during the different legs of the race.

58. In or about June 1998 I caused the CYCA to send a letter to BoM confirming that we would like Ken Batt to speak at the Pre-Race Briefing and for BoM to provide special race forecasts prior to and throughout the race. Annexed and marked "B" is a true copy of the CYCA's letter to BoM dated 11 June 1998.
59. In or about November 1998 I had a meeting with Ken Batt and Bruce Buckley in relation to the services to be provided by BoM during the Telstra Cup and SHYR. To the best of my recollection, during that meeting we had a conversation to the following effect:
- I said: "The Race Management Team is the same as last year. We still have the Young Endeavour as the radio relay vessel with Lew Carter and Michael Brown on board. I am the CYCA contact. In Tasmania, David Boyes and Badenach are involved".
- Batt said: "I know what goes on in Tasmania. I still have my contacts".
- Either Batt or Buckley said:
- "Can you supply us with the updated contact numbers including the fax numbers for the forecasts".
- I said: "Yes".
60. After the above meeting, I had a couple of telephone conversations with Buckley and Batt during which I confirmed the dates of the Pre-Race Briefings, that we required a weather forecast on 25 December 1998 for handicapping purposes and that BoM would distribute the latest weather on the morning of the race at the CYCA .
61. On 27 November 1998 I received a letter from BoM outlining the services they proposed providing, to which I subsequently agreed. Annexed and marked "C" is a true copy of BoM's letter dated 25 November 1998.
62. In or about the first week of December 1998 Holt created the CYCA's contact list for the SHYR. Annexed and marked "D" is true copy of that contact list. Since 1994 contact lists have been distributed every year by the Sailing Office to all persons, organisations and authorities involved in the SHYR including BoM.
63. On 15 December 1998 Ken Batt spoke at the Telstra Cup Pre - Race Briefing at the CYCA. To the best of my recollection, I personally gave Batt a copy of the SHYR contact list during that briefing.



64. Prior to this inquest, I was not aware of any alleged protocol in relation to communications between the CYCA and BoM. My understanding was that if BoM thought something dramatic was going to happen to the weather, they would contact me or someone else from the Race Management Team or Race Committee and inform us.
65. Nor was I aware that when reading a forecast you should allow for wind speeds being up to 40% greater than forecast and wave heights up to 86% greater than forecast. I was never personally made aware of this protocol or that it would apply to the special race forecasts provided by BoM for the SHYR. In my opinion, BoM could not assume that entrants in the SHYR were aware of such a protocol as most sailors are not formally trained in meteorology and have simply learnt about the weather from years of sailing.
66. If I was aware of this protocol, I would have requested that BoM's race forecasts for the SHYR be drafted to reflect what they expected the fleet would actually experience. In my view there is little benefit in obtaining a forecast where wind speeds could be up to 40% greater than forecast.

#### ***24 December 1998 – Pre Race Briefing***

67. Prior the Pre-Race Briefing on 24 December 1998 I compiled a list from the 1998 chart of the yachts that had not submitted all their entry documentation. *Business Post Naiad* was not one of the yachts on that list. At that time, some of the Sailing Office staff and Sailing Committee members discussed the manner in which we should deal with the yachts on the list and it was decided to allow them until midday to submit their outstanding entry documentation. I cannot recall who was specifically involved in that conversation.
68. Prior to the Pre- Race Briefing Holt and Robinson handed out the briefing kits as competitors arrived. During the briefing, Hugo Van Kretschmar, the Commodore, welcomed everyone, I went through the Sailing Instructions, Sam Hughes spoke about the latest search and rescue recovery techniques and Ken Batt spoke in detail about weather typically experienced during the SHYR and gave a weather prognosis for the period of the race.
69. From listening to Batt's weather prognosis, I understood that BoM was still uncertain how the weather was going to develop and that we needed to wait until the day of the race for a more detailed forecast.

70. During the briefing the list of yachts with outstanding entry documentation was put on the overhead and, as previously agreed, they were advised they would not be allowed to race unless their outstanding documentation was in the Sailing Office by 12.00 noon that day. As far as I am aware, all entrants received a briefing kit and all outstanding documentation was submitted by 12.00 noon.

***26 December 1998 – Start of the SHYR***

71. The Sailing Office co-ordinated the start of the SHYR. However, I have outlined my activities on that day under the heading Race Committee.

***RACE COMMITTEE & RACE MANAGEMENT TEAM***

72. As I noted above, the Sailing Committee delegates its responsibility for the management and conduct of the SHYR to the Race Committee from the start of the race. However, the day to day control of the race is delegated to the Race Management Team under the supervision of the Race Director. Consequently, in 1998 there was no schedule for the Race Committee to convene during the race. However, the committee was available, if necessary, to convene and make decisions and/or deal with any issues which arose during the race.
73. The Race Management Team was based in Sydney for the start of the race and from midday on 27 December 1998 was based in the RCC in Hobart.
74. In 1998 the Race Management Team, under my direction, had the following responsibilities:
- (1) Co-ordinating and controlling the on and off water conduct of the race;
  - (2) Monitoring Skeds;
  - (3) Monitoring the weather forecasts received from BoM;
  - (4) Collating position reports and producing results after each Skeds;
  - (5) Updating the website after each Sked;
  - (6) Liaising with Hughes, as the AMSA representative based in the RCC;
  - (7) Liaising and co-ordinating with the RRV, Media Centre and other organisations/ authorities and personnel involved in the SHYR; and

(8) Publication of final results and post-race review in relation to matters which could be improved for the next SHYR.

75. In 1998 Elliott and Robinson had particular responsibilities for producing results after each Sked. Robinson was also responsible for updating the SHYR website after each Sked.

### ***25 December 1998***

76. On 25 December 1998 Sommer, Elliott, Robinson and I, as a quorum of the Race Committee, attended the CYCA to do the course construction for the IMS handicapping based on a 14.00 weather forecast I had received from BoM prior to that meeting. A true copy of that forecast is at page 362 of Volume 13D.

77. To the best of my recollection, I telephoned Batt prior to the meeting to obtain some further detail in relation to the forecast so that we could accurately plot the course construction. I also called Batt once or twice during the meeting for further clarification of certain aspects of the weather. Attached and marked "E" is a true copy of Telstra's facsimile dated 6 April 2000 which lists the local telephone calls made from the CYCA between 24 and 28 December 1998.

78. I cannot recall the content of the 14:00 forecast. However, I do recall that it contained nothing of concern. At the time of preparing this statement I read the 14:00 forecast and am still of that view. Indeed, from that forecast it appears that it was going to be lighter than a "typical" SHYR. When I refer to a "typical" SHYR, I mean the winds will gradually build up over 12 hours. Then, for a period 4 to 8 hours the fleet will experience uncomfortable high winds of 40 to 50 knots with a couple of gusts of 55 to 60 knots for a short period of time. Then, the winds will abate over the next 12 hours.

79. After the above meeting, I arranged for BoM's 14:00 forecast to be posted on the Sailing Office Notice Board and distributed to all entrants by putting it in their respective pigeon holes in the Information Shed.

### ***26 December 1998 – Start of SHYR***

80. On 26 December 1998 I was at the CYCA by approximately 5.30am to prepare for the start of the race and was in and out of the Sailing Office until 11.30am, when I went out on the harbour. To the best of my recollection, Robinson, Elliott, Sommer and Rowley were also in and out of Sailing Office that morning.

81. At or about 6.00am I telephoned BoM and spoke to Senior Forecaster on duty to get an update on the 14:00 forecast I had received on 25 December 1998. There were no major changes in the previous forecast. Annexed and marked "F" are my notes from that conversation, which are written on the 14:00 forecast. I note that I only still hold a photocopy of the first page of that forecast.
82. Shortly thereafter, I met with Robinson and Sommer to review the course construction in light of the weather update I had obtained from BoM. As there were no major changes in the forecast, we decided it was unnecessary to alter the course construction. At or about 9.00am Robinson published the handicaps for the race.
83. Throughout the remainder of the morning I was busy supervising the various preparations for the start of the race.
84. I am aware that at some stage that morning BoM telephoned the Sailing Office and organised with Holt to use the photocopier to copy some forecasts. At or about 9.00am some representatives from BoM arrived to set up the weather stand outside the Sailing Office while Holt photocopied the weather forecast. I do not recall seeing the BoM representatives arrive but I recall seeing them set up the weather stand and Holt photocopying. I was not aware at the time that Holt was photocopying an updated forecast. I was relieved BoM had arrived because they were late and some of the competitors were starting to get impatient. We had already made arrangements to deliver some of the weather packs to other clubs because some competitors could not wait for them to arrive.
85. At or about 10.00am, after they had set up the weather stand and dealt with the initial rush of competitors, I had a brief conversation with the BoM representatives to the following effect:

I said: "Is everything OK?"

One of them said: "We're on top of it".

I then complimented them on their computer presentation. We did not discuss the weather at all. In particular, they did not inform me that the forecast had been increased to a gale warning nor that they had previously told Holt that they wished to speak to the Race Committee about the weather.

86. At or about 11.00am I had a conversation with Ken Batt in the Sailing Office to the following effect:

I said: "Everything Ok? Looks like you got through the bulk of the crew. Thanks for that. Is there anything I should know about the weather?"

Batt said: "Oh there's going to get a bit of a front down off Eden".

I said: "How strong?"

Batt said: "Oh 25 to 35 knots".

I said: "That's pretty standard. They usually get a bit of blow up. What will happen after that?"

Batt said: "It will moderate and go around to the west".

I said: "So it's a pretty standard Hobart race, nothing to worry about".

Batt said: "Yeah, nothing to worry about."

I said: "Ok, I'll speak to you soon".

87. I am not aware of anyone from BoM requesting to speak to the Race Committee that morning. I deny that the Race Committee was scheduled to be briefed by BoM on that morning.

88. At approximately 11.30am I left the Sailing Office and went out on the harbour for the start of the race. The Race Committee, Media Centre and all of the Sailing Office staff involved in the SHYR including Lorraine Gable were out on the water for the start of the race.

89. I returned to Sailing Office at approximately 3.00pm. I spent the remainder of the afternoon filing and packing up with Robinson for our flight to Hobart the following day.

90. During that afternoon I would have read the 9:04 and 12:09 gale warning forecasts and the 14:50 storm warning forecast, which the Sailing Office received by facsimile from BoM. It is my invariable practise to read all the forecasts facsimiled to the CYCA and RCC by BoM. I do not specifically recall reading the above forecasts. However, I do recall that I did not read any forecasts which struck me as being unusual or alarming for a SHYR.

91. At the time of preparing this statement, I read the 14:50 forecast and I am still of the view it contains nothing of particular concern. I note the following in relation to that forecast:

- (1) The storm warning was for south of Merimbula, which was 36 hours down the race track for the majority of the fleet;
- (2) There was only a gale warning from Sydney to Merimbula, which was the area most of the fleet would be sailing in for the next 24 to 36 hours and gale force winds are not unusual for a SHYR;
- (3) It forecasted a N/NE wind of 20/25 knots ahead of W/SW change of 25/35 knots with stronger gusts, which meant the fleet would have a fast run down the coast until the change hit at 25/35 knots with stronger gusts. As they were westerly winds the fleet would sail close to the shore line where the water would be flat and very fast; and
- (4) The gale to storm force westerly winds south of Jervis Bay were expected to moderate Monday evening, so the fleet would hug the coast until the winds abated on the Monday evening.

92. I also note that the 14:50 forecast is similar to the earlier forecasts issued that day.

93. At approximately 6.00pm I had a conversation with Lew Carter in relation to whether the radio problems had been fixed on the RRV. During that discussion, I said words to the following effect:

I said: "You must be moving well down the coast. You're in for a front on the South Coast coming from the West. You should be in nice and close".

94. After the above conversation, I left the CYCA. We had previously arranged that Robinson would monitor the 20:00 Sked and thereafter, produce the results. Furthermore, that Elliott would monitor that Sked from his house.

95. I note that BoM issued two types of forecasts relevant to this inquest, a standard forecast and the special race forecasts for the SHYR. The CYCA and RRV only received the special race forecasts. Therefore, the CYCA and, as far as I am aware, the RRV did not receive the 14:14 storm warning forecast. The special race forecasts the CYCA and RRV received from BoM throughout the SHYR are in Volume 13D at pages 359 to 383. That volume also contains BoM's standard forecasts issued during the race at pages 320 and 359.

96. I am not aware of anyone from BoM calling the CYCA or Media Centre on the afternoon of 26 December 1998 looking for Peter Campbell, the Media Director, or myself. Nor am I aware of anyone from BoM leaving a message in relation to the storm warning or sending a facsimile to the Media Centre containing either the 14:14 or 14:50 storm warning forecast. I did not see the 14:14 storm warning forecast until after the SHYR.
97. If BoM had left a telephone message with the Media Centre or facsimiled the 14:14 or 14:50 storm warning forecast to the Media Centre, the Media Centre staff would have told Robinson or myself as they were just upstairs from the Sailing Office in the CYCA building.
98. If someone from BoM had telephoned the CYCA looking for me they should have been given my mobile number as all internal telephones had a sticker on them with contact numbers for the SHYR including my mobile number.
99. Between 2.00 and 6.00pm three females worked in the CYCA Bar, namely, Emma Miall who worked from 3.00pm to midnight with a half an hour break at 8.00pm, Barbara Carroll who worked from 2pm to 9.30pm with a half an hour break at 7.00pm and Michelle Skien who worked from 3.00pm to 2.00am with a half an hour break at 9.00pm. As far as I am aware, Michelle Skien is now living in Victoria.
100. Given that I know Ken Batt personally and he has my mobile and home phone numbers, I find it surprising that if he was really concerned about the weather situation and the safety of the fleet, why he did not call me either on my mobile telephone or leave a message at home. Ken Batt would have been aware that I would be on the harbour until at least 3.00pm and hence, it was pointless to call the Sailing Office prior to that time.
101. If Ken Batt had contacted me and told me that he was concerned about the weather and the safety of the fleet, I would have advised the RRV to pass those concerns onto the fleet during the 20:00 Sked and request that the fleet assess the situation and seriously consider whether to continue sailing towards Hobart.

***03:00 Sked on 27 December 1998***

102. At approximately 2.45am on 27 December 1998 I returned to the CYCA to monitor the 0300 Sked with Robinson. At or about that time I would have read the 02:13 forecast, which had been facsimiled to the Sailing Office by BoM. I do not specifically recall reading that forecast. However, I do recall that I did not read a forecast at that

time containing anything particularly unusual or alarming. At the time of preparing this statement, I read the 02:13 forecast and I am still of that view.

103. I note the following in relation to the 02:13 forecast:

- (1) Deepening low near 41S 149E moving ENE. At the time of this forecast, the fleet would have been approximately 300 miles north of the low. Consequently, as the low was moving ENE, it should have moved out to sea before the fleet reached that area;
- (2) W/SW winds 25/35 knots with stronger gusts. As the wind was in a westerly direction, the fleet should be inshore or on the rhumb line where the water would be flat. They would be having a very fast ride with winds of 25/35 knots with some stronger gusts of say 45 knots.
- (3) Winds increasing to the south of Merimbula offshore, reaching 40/50 knots that afternoon as the low deepens. I interpret this forecast to mean that the winds of 40/50 knots would accompany the low and hence, would have moved out to sea by the time the fleet reached Merimbula. In any case, 40/50 knot winds, although unpleasant, are not unusual for a SHYR. I also note that I interpreted this forecast to be for a maximum of 40/50 knots offshore as the forecast says "reaching 40/50 knots" and does not mention stronger gusts; and
- (4) The outlook was for W/SW winds to moderate overnight Sunday to 20/25 knots possibly still reaching 35 knots at times near Bass Straight, which meant that by the time the majority of the fleet entered Bass Straight the winds would only be at a maximum of 40/50 knots for a couple of hours before they would start to drop to 20/35 knots, which is a reasonable wind strength for a SHYR.

104. Robinson and I monitored the 03:00 Sked. I recall after the Sked thinking that there were going to be a lot of retirements as the fleet was having a hard fast run down the coast. I also thought it was likely that they would break the race record.

105. For the remainder of the morning I helped Robinson produce the results and then, we organised everything we needed to take to Hobart.



106. At or about 5.45am I telephoned BoM and spoke to the Senior Forecaster to get an update on the weather. I cannot now recall the specifics of that conversation. However, I do recall that the weather forecast was essentially the same as the 02:13 forecast. I refer to annexure "E" being the list of the local telephone calls made from the CYCA between 24 and 28 December 1998.
107. At approximately 8.30am Robinson and I left the CYCA to catch a 10.00am flight to Hobart via Melbourne. Elliott had flown to Hobart on the 6.00am flight to set up the computers in the RCC and monitor the 14:00 Sked. Hughes had also flown to Hobart earlier that morning. Sommer and Rowley were to fly to Hobart on the 2.00pm flight that day. We staggered our flights to Hobart so that the Race Committee/ Race Management Team were not all in the air at the same time and hence, that there was always someone on the ground to handle any issue that arose during the race.
108. When I left the CYCA I was not concerned about the weather. However, I did think we would get a lot of retirements because of the speed the fleet was travelling.
109. Our flight from Melbourne to Hobart was delayed so when we arrived in Hobart, we went straight to the RCC. We arrived at the RCC just at the start or a little bit into the 14:00 Sked. I recall Elliott was monitoring the Sked when we arrived.

**14:00 Sked on 27 December 1998**

110. I cannot recall the specifics of the weather broadcasted during that Sked except that the conditions were expected to abate the following day. However, I do recall *Sword of Orion* advised it was experiencing westerly winds of 50 to 65 knots with gusts up to 78 knots, which was far more severe than had been forecasted, and that another yacht was experiencing similar conditions. Furthermore, that there were a lot of yachts who had retired or were heading to Eden.
111. I was alarmed by the weather conditions *Sword of Orion* was experiencing as I had expected the fleet to experience maximum winds of 50 knots which would abate over Sunday night. As *Sword of Orion* typically is in the middle of the fleet, I thought that most of the fleet were probably experiencing similar conditions.
112. During and after the Sked, Elliott, Robinson and I discussed the weather information received from *Sword of Orion* and Elliott gave me an update on which yachts had retired and generally what had happened while I was in the air. I cannot recall the precise content of that conversation.

113. Shortly thereafter, I contacted the RRV and requested that they broadcast a message to the fleet asking them to assess their situation and the weather being experienced and to seriously consider whether to continue before entering Bass Straight and reminding the skippers that it was their responsibility to decide whether to continue racing based on an assessment of their yacht, crew and the weather. As far as I am aware that message was broadcasted by the RRV to the fleet. However, I did not hear it as yachtcomms did not operate after the 14:00 Sked finished.
114. Yachtcomms is a Telstra telephone link up with channel 4483 which allows us to monitor the Skeds in the RCC and transmit to the RRV and fleet if necessary. However, yachtcomms was only operational during the Skeds. At all other times the Radio Room, which was next door, kept us informed of what was reported on the radio. The Radio Room had 2 VHF radios, 1 HF radio and an HF receiver and was manned 24 hours a day.
115. At or about the 14:00 Sked on water incidents began to be reported and escalated quickly as the afternoon progressed. During that afternoon *VC Offshore* rolled and issued a May Day and at approximately 17:00 AMSA declared a May Day for the general area because there were multiple incidents. Not long thereafter, we were advised that *Winston Churchill* had issued a May Day, abandoned their yacht, which was sinking, and that the crew were in life rafts.
116. Late on the afternoon of 27 December 1998 Sommer arrived at the RCC. At or about that time Bush telephoned the RCC and told us he was sending Greg Halls to Eden to look after the retiring yachts as they arrived.
117. During the remainder of the evening the incidents continued to escalate including the issuing of May Days, man overboard ("MOB") being reported on *Kingurra* and *Sword of Orion* and yachts being rolled or knocked down and dismantled.
118. In relation to *Business Post Naiad*, I recall that there was a problem getting the May Day confirmed. After the first knock down, there were some crew that were injured and wanted to be airlifted, however, overall it appeared the crew was not in immediate danger of loss of life as they were motoring to Eden. At or about this time I rang the RRV to see if *Business Post Naiad's* May Day was still current given they were motoring to Eden. We could not get the May Day confirmed. Later that evening we were advised that *Business Post Naiad* was running out of fuel. At that point, we discussed what we would do if they ran out of fuel and decided to just wait and see what happened and that AMSA would airlift the injured crew when assets were

available. At some stage we were informed that *Midnight Special* was standing by *Business Post Naiad*.

119. Throughout this period Elliott, Hughes, Robinson, Sommer, Rowley, Badenach, Elizabeth Drolz, my wife, and myself were in the RCC and we were primarily performing the following tasks:

- (1) Recording incidents/events as they occurred and hence, keeping abreast of the status of the fleet and the yachts in trouble. In this regard, we attached pieces of paper to the windows in the RCC and recorded:
  - (a) Events relating to yachts in serious trouble. For example, May Days and MOB;
  - (b) Yachts with other incidents or who had missed Skeds; and
  - (c) Yachts that had retired and whether they had arrived safely at their destination.

Individual persons in the RCC also kept logs.

- (2) Facilitating/ co-ordinating a flow of information between AMSA, the RRV and the fleet to enable AMSA to co-ordinate rescue operations and to enable us to keep relatives informed;
  - (3) Keeping relatives of the yachts informed. Generally enquiries were made to the RYCT Telephone Information Centre which had 7 operators each of whom had a computer which could access the yachts positions and results and other information in relation to the SHYR. However, as matters deteriorated, I directed the telephone operators to transfer the relatives of the yachts in serious trouble to the RCC so that we could communicate with them directly as information came to hand; and
  - (4) Continuing the routine co-ordination and management of the SHYR.
120. The above tasks were largely allocated to certain persons. Hughes liaised with AMSA and the fleet through the RRV and communicated with the relatives of yachts in serious trouble. Elliott assisted Hughes. I continued to oversee the co-ordination and management of the SHYR, liaised with Hughes and the RRV and generally tried to keep abreast of the status of the yachts in trouble. Robinson and my wife recorded information as it came into the RCC. Badenach, Sommer and Rowley contacted the

relatives of the retired yachts and informed them that they had retired, where they were heading and their estimated time of arrival. All other tasks were allocated as they were required to be done.

121. Throughout this period I frequently spoke to the RRV as did Hughes and Elliott so that the RRV could relay information in relation to the rescue operations to the fleet and they could give us the details of any new incidents as they occurred. I also frequently spoke to Peter Bush and kept him informed on any developments as they occurred.
122. Prior to the SHYR, it had been arranged that Peter Bush would be the CYCA media spokesperson for the race. As matters started to deteriorate, Bush set up a crisis centre manned by volunteers in the CYCA Sydney. I understood that they were dealing with numerous enquiries and Bush also kept the media briefed. The CYCA Sydney communicated with some of the relatives of yachts in serious trouble as they had contacted the CYCA Sydney first and we decided to continue to communicate through the original CYCA contact.
123. I also recall at some point I had a discussion with Hughes as to whether we should try and move some of the traffic off the race frequency, namely, yachts that had retired and were periodically reporting into the RRV. Hughes advised me that AMSA did not want to move yachts off the race frequency because whilst it was congested, it was better having everyone on one frequency so that they could help out where necessary.
124. At some time late on the evening of 27 December 1998 or in the early hours of 28 December 1998, Hughes told me that AMSA wanted us to consider calling off the race. At that time, I rang BoM for a weather update and I was advised by the Senior Forecaster on duty that he was unsure which direction the storm was going, however, that the winds would abate to less than 15 knots over the next 24 hours.
125. After receiving the weather update from BoM, I was of the opinion we should not abandon the race because:
  - (1) BoM was uncertain which way the storm was going;
  - (2) At that time we had stopped getting the very high wind reports and hence, it appeared that the fleet was through worst of the storm and that if they headed back toward Eden they may actually turn back into the storm when continuing towards Hobart was probably safer;

- (3) If we abandoned the race the fleet would invariably return to Eden and not be as vigilant in listening and reporting in at Skeds. Consequently, we would lose control of the fleet and be unable to provide support as we would not know exactly where the fleet was nor be able to ask yachts to lend assistance to yachts in distress;
- (4) It was of no advantage to the fleet if we abandoned the race as they would still be in the conditions. We could not remove the fleet from the area. At least if they continued to report at Skeds, the RCC could provide assistance in conjunction with AMSA where necessary;
- (5) BoM had forecast for the winds to abate over the next 24 hours;
- (6) Each yacht, after assessing their yacht, crew and the weather conditions, could still return to Eden if they decided that was the safest course. However, they would make that decision because that was the right decision in their particular circumstances. Not because we had abandoned the race and it was an automatic reaction which was not necessarily the safest and best decision; and
- (7) Additionally, I did not want to derogate from the skippers decision making power as the skipper was and will always be in the best position to decide the safest manner in which to proceed based on an assessment of his yacht, crew and the weather conditions. It is for this very reason that the RRS enshrine fundamental rule 4 Decision to Race.

126. After I obtained the weather update from BoM, we discussed whether we should abandon the race. To the best of my recollection, Hughes, Elliott, Robinson, Sommer, myself and possibly Badenach were involved in that discussion.

127. I cannot recall the specifics of what was said by whom during the above conversation. However, I do recall that I started the discussion by saying words to the following effect:

I said: "AMSA has asked us to consider abandoning the race. I've spoken to the bureau and they said they are unclear on which way the storm is heading but that the winds are forecasted to abate to less than 15 knots over the next 24 hours. I don't think we should abandon the race because the bureau is uncertain which way the storm is going. We've stopped getting the very high wind reports and it appears the fleet has weathered through the worst of the

storm. If we abandon the race now they may actually turn back into the storm. Additionally, we will lose control over the fleet because they won't be as vigilant with Skeds. There is no point to abandoning, we can't remove the yachts from the area. They're out there and they would have already made the right decision based on their individual circumstances".

128. I do not recall what was said at the point in the discussion except that everyone agreed that we should not abandon the race. At the conclusion of the discussion, Hughes telephoned AMSA with our decision and reasons for not abandoning the race. As far as I am aware, AMSA agreed with our decision as Hughes did not discuss it further with me after telephoning AMSA.
129. Overnight I continued to monitor the weather and as the winds abated quickly over the next couple of hours, I believed our decision not to abandon the race was correct. We did not discuss abandoning the race again.
130. In retrospect, I am still of the view that we made the right decision in not abandoning the race as the yachts that turned around and headed towards Eden, being the closest safe port, were the yachts that got into trouble as they were sailing beam on (ie: parallel to the storm).
131. At the time of preparing this statement I have had the opportunity to read Hughes' police interview dated 20 July 1999 and Brian Willey's police interview dated 9 November 1999. I agree with Hughes that it was too late at that time to abandon the race, the fleet was already in and/or past the storm. I also agree that the RCC was not aware from the forecasts or otherwise of the conditions the fleet were to encounter during the storm until *Sword of Orion* advised the winds they were experiencing during the 14:00 Sked and by the that time the majority of the fleet was in the storm.
132. In relation to Hughes and Willey's versions of their conversations in relation to abandoning the race, I am personally unaware of the content of their conversations. However, as far as I was aware Hughes conveyed our views on abandoning the race to AMSA and they did not express disagreement with those views.

**28 December 1998**

133. The RCC continued to operate on 28 December 1998 as it had done throughout the afternoon/evening of 27 December 1998.

134. I recall that early that morning AMSA released the name of the MOB from *Sword of Orion* being Glynn Charles. At that point, Rowley was tasked to make contact with Glynn's mother in England. However, he was unable to contact her because a number was missing from her telephone number on the crew list. Rowley eventually arranged for Mrs Charles to be contacted through Scotland Yard.
135. I was present for the 03:00 Sked. I do not recall anything in particular about that Sked excepts that the fleet was asked to deactivate their beacons if they were not in imminent danger.
136. To the best of my recollection, some stage after that Sked I went and had a couple of hours sleep.
137. At some stage that morning we were informed that 7 crew from *Business Post Naiad* had been airlifted with two dead crew remaining on board. This news was a shock. As far as I was aware *Business Post Naiad* was motoring towards Eden.
138. I was still in the RCC for the 14:00 Sked. However, I do not recall anything in relation to that Sked. Throughout 28 December 1998 my mind was focussed on the MOB from *Sword of Orion* and finding the life rafts from *Winston Churchill*.
139. Later that evening the first life raft from *Winston Churchill* was found, the search for the MOB on *Sword of Orion* was terminated and then, the second life raft from *Winston Churchill* was found and we were advised it had two crew on board and that the three remaining crew had been swept from the life raft earlier that morning.
140. At some stage late on 28 December 1998 I had another couple of hours sleep but I cannot recall when.

### **29 December 1998**

141. On the morning of 29 December 1998 I recall Mick Bannister's body being found and having to be identified by one of the crew from *Winston Churchill*. Then, later that afternoon the search for the two remaining MOB from *Winston Churchill* was terminated. From that time on we were in a really difficult position because we knew the identities of the MOB but we were not allowed to inform the relatives until they were notified by the proper authority. It was a very disturbing period particularly as the media was reporting everything they heard whether it was confirmed or not. Understandably their relatives were getting very angry and upset with us. It was not until the next morning that the relatives were informed by the police of the two deaths from *Winston Churchill*.

142. At some stage on 29 December 1998 we had a debrief in the RCC. At that time we were very tired and in my opinion it was not a "true" debrief. Annexed and marked "G" is a true copy of the notes from that debrief. Those notes accord with my recollection of our discussion.
143. On or about 29 December 1998 Hugo Van Kretschmar arrived in Hobart. From that time on, the Race Management Team ensured that the rest of the race ran smoothly and that all yachts were accounted for and reached their destinations safely.
144. Throughout the race I had my mobile telephone with me, which was always switched on.
145. Despite a disaster plan not being in place in 1998, in my opinion the RCC managed and conducted the SHYR competently throughout the on water crisis.

#### **CYCA's SHYR Race Review Report ("HRR")**

146. After the HRR was handed down, the board appointed Rowley, Sommer and myself to implement the HRR recommendations. I am aware that Peter Bush has outlined the manner in which the HRR recommendations have been implemented. Therefore, I will not repeat that information in my statement.
147. I refer to page 46 of the HRR and note there are some mistakes in relation to the special race forecasts by BoM. Most importantly:

26/12 09:04	Should state S/SW 30/35 knots
26/12 12:09	Should state S/SW 30/35 knots
26/12 14:40	Should state W/SW 25/35 knots


#### **Police Interview**

148. I have reviewed my police interviews on 2 January 1999 and 20 October 1999 and have corrected some of my answers in the above paragraphs. I also wish to make the following comments in relation to some of my answers in my interview dated 20 October 1999.




149. My answers to questions 56, 78-98, 118-123 and 134-135 are incorrect. There was not a vetting committee. In 1998 I reviewed and vetted all Applications. However, if an Application was contentious or I otherwise needed direction, I referred it to the Sailing Committee. As far as I am aware, the initials "GC" were placed on the Applications after the SHYR.
150. In relation to question 200. I would not have seen *Business Post Naiad's* current certificate because current IMS and CHS certificates were put on Robinson's desk for his review, approval and ticking on the 1998 chart.
151. In relation to question 304. *Business Post Naiad* was not one of the 8 to 10 applicants asked to provide additional information prior to being sent an Entry Form because, as I mentioned above, in 1998 we sent Entry Forms to applicants who had submitted a valid but not current IMS certificate with their Application. However, they were not eligible to race IMS unless they submitted a valid current certificate by 22 December 1998.
152. During my police interview I could not recall if I telephoned Bruce Guy after receiving *Business Post Naiad's* Application to advise him that he was only eligible to race PHS until such time as he submitted a valid current IMS certificate. Now having had time to think about it further, I do recall telephoning Bruce Guy and having a conversation to the effect set out in paragraph 51 above.
153. In relation to question 450. I cannot recall what was said during that conversation. However, I do recall that the Senior Forecaster confirmed the earlier forecast.
154. In relation to question 604. The paperwork for each yacht is checked each year.
155. In 1998 the Sailing Office did not receive an email from the AYF which contained stability data. However, we did receive an email which contained various data to enable us to do the IMS course construction.

Dated: 2 July 2000



.....  
Phillip Thompson



# Cruising Yacht Club of Australia

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*ADDRESS ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER*

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Dear Hobart Competitor,

Thank you for your recent Application for Entry in the 1998 Telstra Sydney-Hobart Yacht Race. We are pleased to inform you that your entry has been accepted. Please fill in the attached Entry Form and return it to us no later than Friday November 27, 1998.

You will note that there are three Entry Fees for this years race:-


1. \$750.00 for yachts with no advertising under Appendix 3, Category A, or
2. \$1,100.00 for yachts with advertising under Category B, or
3. \$2,000.00 for yachts with advertising under Category C.

The Telstra Cup Regatta will be run from December 16-20 and an Entry Form is attached. Please note the Sydney-Hobart does not form part of this Regatta .

Another race you may be interested in is The King of the Derwent, which will be held on the Derwent River in Hobart on January 2.

Good luck in this year's race,

Phil Thompson,  
Sailing Manager.



# Cruising Yacht Club of Australia

A.C.N. 000 116 423

New Beach Road, Darling Point, N.S.W. 2027

Telephone: (02) 9363 9731 • Fax: (02) 9363 9745

ADDRESS ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO THE GENERAL MANAGER

11 June 1998

Mr.J.R.Colquhoun  
Manager  
Forecasting Services  
Bureau of Meteorology  
PO Box 413  
Darlinghurst NSW 2010

Dear Mr.Colquhoun,

**Re: 1998 Telstra Sydney-Hobart Yacht Race**

The Cruising Yacht Club of Australia appreciates the assistance provided by the Bureau of Meteorology during the Sydney-Hobart Race each year.

Again we require weather updates during the event, in addition we wish to reserve the services of Mr.Ken Batt for the race briefing on Thursday 24 December 1998 at 9:00am. Prior to the Sydney-Hobart event we would like Ken to provide a weather forecast for the Sydney-Gold Coast Race Briefing on Thursday 30 July at 6:00pm.

Should you require further details please contact Mr.Phil Thompson, CYCA Sailing Manager on 9363 4445.

Yours sincerely,

**BRUCE ROWLEY**  
General Manager




# BUREAU OF METEOROLOGY

NEW SOUTH WALES REGIONAL OFFICE 300 Elizabeth Street, Sydney NSW 2000 Tel: (02) 9296 1555 Fax: (02) 9296 1589  
ADDRESS CORRESPONDENCE TO, Regional Director Bureau of Meteorology PO Box 413 Darlinghurst NSW 2010

In reply please quote

File: 70/16/20

Attn: Mr Philip Thompson  
Cruising Yacht Club of Australia  
New Beach Road  
DARLING POINT NSW 2027



## Sydney - Hobart + Southern Cross Yacht Race Weather Services

Dear Philip,

Following our recent discussions, the following services are proposed in support of the 54<sup>th</sup> Sydney-Hobart Yacht Race, including pre race briefings as discussed for the Southern Cross Yacht Race Series, most notably the Sydney-Hobart Yacht Race. The briefing for the latter event is to be held at 9AM on 24 December 1998.

The quote for the forecasting services is as follows:

### Forecasts provided from Sydney (All times Eastern Summer Time) (Contact: Senior forecaster 9296 1639)

Pre-race briefing: 0900 Thursday 24 December  
(Cruising Yacht Club)

Dec 26	2 forecasts (0500, 1000, 1300)	Sydney - Jervis Bay
Dec 27	2 forecasts (0200, 1300)	Jervis Bay - Gabo Is
Dec 28	2 forecasts (0200, 1300)	Jervis Bay - Gabo Is

### Forecasts provided from Hobart

(Contact: Senior Meteorologist 03 6221 2000 – mention Sydney to Hobart Race)

Dec 27	1 forecast (1300)	Bass Strait
Dec 28	2 forecasts (0200, 1300)	Bass St + E. Coast Tasmania.
Dec 29	2 forecasts (0200, 1300)	Bass St + E. Coast Tasmania.
Dec 30	2 forecasts (0200, 1300)	Bass St + E. Coast Tasmania.
Dec 31	2 forecasts (0200, 1300)	Bass St + E. Coast Tasmania.

As is usual, the Sydney Office will provide forecasts to 38 South and the Hobart Office will provide the forecasts from 38 South to Hobart.

The cost breakdown is as follows:

Pre race briefing and General weather support	=	\$286.00
16 forecasts	@ \$36.00 each	= \$576.00
Transmission costs	@ \$6.60	= \$105.60
Total		\$967.60

This price is based upon sending the forecasts directly to the Young Endeavour. In addition to this the forecasts will be faxed to the Cruising Yacht Club of Australia and

the Tasmanian issued forecasts also to the Cruising Yacht Club in Hobart. Note that payment for the above services should be directed to the NSW Regional Office, not to our Head Office.

As a promotional exercise, it is intended that open access to a suite of products, including current coastal weather observations and numerical weather prediction output, will be provided through our web page (<http://www.bom.gov.au>) to cover the period of the Southern Cross Series from 15 December though until 1 January 1999. We also intend to set up our usual briefing facility at Rushcutters Bay on the morning of 26 December 1998.

An e-mail address has been set up for those 20 or so yachts with this facility to enable them to email into the Bureau's forecasting offices in Sydney and Hobart their current weather observations. The e-mail address is:

**whrsyd@bom.gov.au**

The observations can be provided in plain language, but should include:

- Time (Eastern Summer Time)
- Latitude and Longitude
- Average wind speed, direction and maximum gust
- Seas
- Swell
- Other remarks (weather conditions and other comments)


Please confirm the suitability of the above arrangements, with suggestions for alterations to the services being most welcome. We will proceed with the establishment of the appropriate arrangements at our Sydney and Hobart offices.

We trust all will progress smoothly for these important yachting events. Please do not hesitate to contact me on (02) 9296 1528 for any further information on the above.

Yours sincerely,



Bruce Buckley  
Supervising Meteorologist, NSW RFC  
25 November 1998

Telstra Sydney - Hobart Yacht Race 1998  
Race Personnel - Contact List**Cruising Yacht Club of Australia**

Phone: (02) 9363 9731  
 Fax: (02) 9363 9745  
 Poll Fax: 1 902 935 680  
 Recorded Information: 1 902 240 520  
 Web Site: syd-hob.telstra.com.au

**Hotel Grand Chancellor**

Phone: (03) 6235 4535  
 Fax: (03) 6223 8175

**Wrest Point**

Phone: (03) 6225 0112  
 Fax: (03) 6225 3744

**Royal Yacht Club of Tasmania**

Phone: (03) 6223 4599  
 Fax: (03) 6223 1308

Michael Wearne (03) 6223 4599  
 General Manager 0417 052 086

Information Line in Hobart: (03) 6224 1441  
 (03) 6234 5853  
 (03) 6224 3687

**Castray Esplanade Finishing Box**

Phone: (03) 6223 3082  
 Fax: (03) 6224 0056

**Liaison / Information Centre - Constitution Dock**

Phone: (03) 6223 7567  
 (03) 6223 5706  
 Fax: (03) 6223 6957  
 Computer: (03) 6223 7218

**Telstra**

Suzie Powell (03) 9252 1372 (Business)  
 0418 312 718

Ewen Rankin (03) 9632 8192 (Business)  
 0418 347 718

Warren Keys (03) 9808 8033  
 0418 993 569

Phil Thompson 9363 4445 (Sailing Office)  
 9363 9745 (Fax)  
 0417 282 172  
 9909 2643 (Home)

Mark Robinson 0418 966 766  
 Email sailingoffice@bigpond.com

Hugo van Kretschmar 0419 695 434

Hans Sommer 9953 5899 (Home)  
 Race Chairman 9428 2900 (Business)  
 0418 221 710

Peter Bush 9953 5899 (Home)  
 Immediate Past Commodore 0412 603 209

Alan Green 0414 505 666

Martin James 0419 401 902

Bruce Rowley 9363 3634 (Direct Business)  
 General Manager 9363 9581 (Direct Fax)  
 9362 8995 (Home)  
 0418 733 933

Howard Elliott 0411 508 810

Mark Pryke 0419 223 344

Sam Hughes 018 622 723  
 Aus Sar

Peter Campbell 9869 8489 (Home)  
 9869 8197 (Business)  
 0419 385 028

Lisa Smith 9521 7130 (Home)  
 0418 428 511

Young Endeavour  
 (Radio Relay Vessel)  
 Cpt Neil Galletly 450 300 141 (Sat Com)

Michael Brown 0408 446 794

" E "



Facsimile

To Nina McKinnon

Telstra Business Solutions

Company Cruising Yacht Club of Australia

Accounts

02-93620613

Facsimile 02 93639745

Locked Bag 1634  
Adelaide SA 5800

From Frances Frank

Telephone 1800 819980  
Facsimile 1800 627626

Your Ref

Date 6 April 2000

Total Pages

COMPLETION ADVICE

Dear Nina,

Your request to have local calls itemised from the 24<sup>th</sup> December 98 to 28<sup>th</sup> December 98 on account 124305:100 was received on the 3<sup>rd</sup> April 00.

This has now been completed and on the following pages are local call details made from service nos: 02-93639731 : 02-93639733 : 02-93639735 : 02-93639732 : 02-93639734 : 02-93634445

A charge of \$3.00 per account is incurred when itemised local calls are requested, but on this occasion the fee has been waived.

Should you require further information or assistance, please contact me on the telephone number indicated above and quote request number .

Yours sincerely,

*Frances Frank*

Frances Frank  
Teleservice

The information contained in this facsimile message is confidential. It is only intended for the recipient named above. If you are not the intended recipient any use, disclosure, or copying of this facsimile is unauthorised and prohibited. If you have received this facsimile in error, please notify the sender so that arrangements can be made for its retrieval or destruction.

Telstra Corporation Limited  
ACN 051 775 556

LOCAL ITEMISED CALLS

SERVICE NO: 02-93639731

24/12/98	01:34:51	0213450644	00:00:04	.25
24/12/98	04:07:59	0213450644	00:00:04	.25
24/12/98	07:57:22	0293628995	00:00:51	.25
24/12/98	08:53:45	02132032	00:03:01	.25
24/12/98	08:56:53	02132032	00:02:36	.25
24/12/98	09:02:07	0292647822	00:00:53	.25
24/12/98	09:06:20	0293894929	00:00:33	.25
24/12/98	10:27:49	0299224333	00:01:22	.25
24/12/98	10:32:09	0299242208	00:00:04	.25
24/12/98	10:51:48	0296601266	00:03:18	.25
24/12/98	11:07:44	0293175011	00:00:32	.25
24/12/98	11:21:49	0293175011	00:00:18	.25
24/12/98	11:54:46	0294845964	00:00:33	.25
24/12/98	12:03:23	0292203124	00:00:19	.25
24/12/98	12:10:49	0299664044	00:00:47	.25
24/12/98	12:29:32	0299646450	00:01:27	.25
24/12/98	13:06:32	0293267666	00:01:44	.25
24/12/98	14:01:05	0293261003	00:00:10	.25
24/12/98	14:20:38	0293175011	00:00:11	.25
24/12/98	14:25:05	0294880161	00:02:05	.25
24/12/98	14:54:45	0293652095	00:10:38	.25
24/12/98	15:54:38	0293175011	00:00:19	.25
24/12/98	16:36:24	0293630900	00:00:39	.25
24/12/98	18:26:51	0293693374	00:00:49	.25
24/12/98	18:41:59	02131008	00:01:40	.25
24/12/98	19:55:58	0296645521	00:00:56	.25
25/12/98	10:58:22	02131314	00:03:39	.25
25/12/98	11:32:44	0292961622	00:00:24	.25
25/12/98	12:25:23	0293809764	00:00:35	.25
25/12/98	14:36:14	0292961622	00:00:06	.25
25/12/98	14:36:36	0292961675	00:02:45	.25
25/12/98	15:52:26	0292961675	00:02:14	.25
25/12/98	19:13:42	0295199104	00:02:09	.25
26/12/98	03:26:11	0298276952	00:01:32	.25
26/12/98	09:15:32	0293492801	00:00:16	.25
26/12/98	09:17:44	0292964650	00:00:22	.25
26/12/98	10:08:43	0293167920	00:03:22	.25
26/12/98	10:55:10	0293273149	00:00:18	.25
26/12/98	11:37:39	0293286720	00:00:55	.25
26/12/98	11:47:36	0293286720	00:01:40	.25
26/12/98	12:06:12	0295553155	00:00:41	.25
26/12/98	12:07:51	0297554660	00:03:53	.25
26/12/98	13:13:19	0293314180	00:00:53	.25
26/12/98	14:16:51	0293629197	00:00:06	.25
26/12/98	16:06:36	0292961675	00:02:56	.25
27/12/98	10:22:57	0298172115	00:04:10	.25
27/12/98	14:31:28	0293631344	00:00:23	.25
27/12/98	15:09:17	0299497119	00:00:37	.25
27/12/98	18:16:10	0299693942	00:01:27	.25
27/12/98	18:20:40	0299693942	00:01:07	.25
27/12/98	18:24:06	0298745656	00:00:27	.25
27/12/98	18:24:57	0293372351	00:01:16	.25
27/12/98	18:26:44	0293898885	00:01:18	.25
27/12/98	18:35:40	0294494173	00:01:23	.25
27/12/98	18:37:24	0299495124	00:01:54	.25
27/12/98	18:51:29	0295230954	00:01:04	.25
27/12/98	19:42:16	0295456646	00:00:52	.25
27/12/98	20:15:43	0293287462	00:00:07	.25
27/12/98	20:17:31	0293629197	00:01:32	.25
27/12/98	20:26:31	0298162763	00:00:39	.25
27/12/98	20:30:05	0283540688	00:07:19	.25
27/12/98	20:58:55	0298175558	00:00:37	.25
27/12/98	21:05:34	0293629197	00:00:16	.25
27/12/98	21:28:47	0296652718	00:01:04	.25
27/12/98	21:30:08	0296645521	00:01:20	.25
27/12/98	22:05:19	0299584118	00:01:21	.25
27/12/98	22:52:19	0299534395	00:00:16	.25
27/12/98	23:38:35	0295230954	00:01:19	.25
27/12/98	23:43:03	0298164184	00:03:24	.2
28/12/98	00:31:23	1300655009	00:00:19	.25
28/12/98	08:20:14	0293629197	00:00:23	.25



28/12/98	10:33:41	0294394577	00:00:15	.25
28/12/98	11:37:35	0292961622	00:00:05	.25
28/12/98	12:08:17	02131000	00:02:20	.25
28/12/98	12:40:48	0292810000	00:02:57	.25
28/12/98	13:09:45	02131300	00:04:51	.25
28/12/98	13:16:12	02131300	00:07:51	.25
28/12/98	16:02:46	0296655447	00:01:24	.25
28/12/98	16:16:43	0296655447	00:00:36	.25
28/12/98	17:44:11	0293714837	00:04:08	.25
28/12/98	22:01:44	0293714837	00:01:18	.25
28/12/98	23:21:04	0292810000	00:00:26	.25
28/12/98	23:22:13	0292810000	00:02:56	.25

**SERVICE 02-93619733**

24/12/98	09:00:32	0295288680	00:00:40	.25
24/12/98	10:46:01	0295286995	00:00:36	.25
24/12/98	12:12:37	0299242208	00:05:31	.25
24/12/98	15:54:30	02131255	00:00:59	.25
26/12/98	09:26:53	0293273149	00:00:09	.25
26/12/98	10:04:24	0293175011	00:02:03	.25
26/12/98	11:59:55	0293375350	00:01:08	.25
26/12/98	13:12:14	0293716880	00:00:46	.25
27/12/98	05:48:17	0292961675	00:01:22	.25
27/12/98	22:51:36	0296106705	00:00:27	.25
27/12/98	23:31:01	0294167794	00:05:07	.25

**SERVICE 02-93639735**

24/12/98	08:24:39	0293175011	00:01:32	.25
24/12/98	08:58:24	0293275444	00:01:19	.25
24/12/98	09:00:06	0293275688	00:00:23	.25
24/12/98	09:02:01	0292111011	00:00:24	.25
24/12/98	09:43:33	0293175011	00:00:53	.25
24/12/98	10:12:16	0295275105	00:03:08	.25
24/12/98	10:20:11	0293275139	00:02:49	.25
24/12/98	10:25:06	0293953522	00:01:04	.25
24/12/98	11:02:25	0293823503	00:09:03	.25
24/12/98	12:27:33	0295654597	00:00:32	.25
24/12/98	12:55:15	0295654597	00:08:06	.25
26/12/98	09:50:08	0293261079	00:00:32	.25
26/12/98	10:10:41	0293261079	00:00:04	.25
27/12/98	16:09:51	0299535899	00:00:42	.25
27/12/98	18:05:15	0298777366	00:01:27	.25
27/12/98	20:51:24	0292883798	00:01:37	.25
27/12/98	21:40:47	0296925411	00:03:19	.25
27/12/98	21:47:53	0296925411	00:01:10	.25
27/12/98	22:50:44	0299973036	00:00:48	.25
27/12/98	22:59:33	0293996840	00:04:40	.25
27/12/98	23:08:20	0299994105	00:01:16	.25
27/12/98	23:19:10	0299994105	00:04:18	.25
28/12/98	07:54:10	0293331210	00:01:07	.25
28/12/98	07:55:48	0293331210	00:13:15	.25
28/12/98	08:15:27	0295242841	00:00:29	.25
28/12/98	11:36:50	0293273149	00:03:56	.25
28/12/98	12:40:39	0299535899	00:02:15	.25
28/12/98	14:46:18	0298164184	00:00:41	.25
28/12/98	16:26:53	0298881872	00:11:34	.25
28/12/98	17:18:29	0296925411	00:01:30	.25

SERVICE 02-93639732

24/12/98	09:07:41	0293692101	00:00:57	.25
24/12/98	09:15:01	0292149818	00:03:05	.25
24/12/98	09:38:20	0293629197	00:00:07	.25
24/12/98	09:38:50	0293273149	00:00:05	.25
24/12/98	10:01:31	0293629197	00:02:28	.25
24/12/98	10:28:20	0299307500	00:02:06	.25
24/12/98	10:40:21	0299635312	00:00:11	.25
24/12/98	10:41:31	0299635312	00:00:20	.25
24/12/98	11:02:11	02131255	00:00:56	.25
24/12/98	12:54:19	0299050800	00:01:45	.25
24/12/98	13:08:40	0293630423	00:00:28	.25
24/12/98	17:40:23	0293633707	00:00:45	.25
24/12/98	19:21:33	0299486677	00:00:23	.25
25/12/98	14:38:46	0293609754	00:00:21	.25
25/12/98	17:04:01	0292961675	00:00:37	.25
26/12/98	08:42:32	0293273149	00:01:08	.25
26/12/98	10:45:28	02131300	00:00:21	.25
26/12/98	10:45:58	02131300	00:03:16	.25
26/12/98	11:30:38	0293275185	00:02:21	.25
26/12/98	11:43:57	0293286720	00:03:00	.25
26/12/98	11:57:22	0293375350	00:02:17	.25
26/12/98	13:41:16	0299496255	00:03:15	.25
26/12/98	13:58:16	0293375350	00:00:32	.25
27/12/98	14:52:18	0293631344	00:00:24	.25
27/12/98	15:13:45	02131017	00:01:05	.25
27/12/98	18:25:45	0298175558	00:00:14	.25
27/12/98	18:30:14	0293323286	00:02:45	.25
27/12/98	19:19:09	0299554356	00:01:47	.25
27/12/98	19:23:47	0298777369	00:01:18	.25
27/12/98	19:38:13	0293652577	00:02:11	.25
27/12/98	19:56:17	0299695501	00:00:43	.25
27/12/98	21:05:35	0293650769	00:00:42	.25
27/12/98	21:15:19	02944494178	00:01:10	.25
27/12/98	21:46:12	0299391482	00:02:12	.25
28/12/98	06:02:33	0299554356	00:02:12	.25
28/12/98	10:31:33	0299727002	00:00:27	.25
28/12/98	12:48:32	02131300	00:05:14	.25
28/12/98	12:54:30	02131300	00:03:33	.25
28/12/98	13:16:30	02131300	00:00:03	.25
28/12/98	13:26:03	0293714837	00:02:03	.25
28/12/98	19:35:23	0293714837	00:02:19	.25
28/12/98	19:38:56	0292810000	00:05:45	.25
28/12/98	19:52:13	0293652095	00:03:09	.25
28/12/98	22:13:58	0299535899	00:01:28	.25
28/12/98	22:52:05	0292810000	00:02:06	.25

SERVICE 02-93639734

24/12/98	09:47:43	0297961635	00:00:15	.25
24/12/98	10:19:39	0293898555	00:06:20	.25
24/12/98	10:31:33	0293898555	00:00:21	.25
24/12/98	11:02:39	0294382500	00:02:48	.25
24/12/98	11:43:06	0294606660	00:04:44	.25
26/12/98	10:11:47	0293261079	00:00:48	.25
26/12/98	12:31:48	0296925411	00:01:13	.25
26/12/98	12:37:15	0299682549	00:00:46	.25
27/12/98	17:50:51	0299535899	00:00:29	.25
27/12/98	18:23:23	0298777366	00:01:24	.25
27/12/98	20:21:21	0295467536	00:05:11	.25
27/12/98	20:32:00	0299535899	00:01:18	.25
27/12/98	21:27:49	0292882605	00:00:35	.25
27/12/98	23:10:10	0299091904	00:03:31	.25
28/12/98	09:12:37	0293652095	00:00:37	.25
28/12/98	10:30:15	0299227002	00:00:14	.25
28/12/98	12:35:06	0299975265	00:02:46	.25
28/12/98	13:30:56	02131300	00:05:07	.25
28/12/98	14:29:28	0296925411	00:06:12	.25
28/12/98	15:49:51	0294303715	00:02:40	.25
28/12/98	16:13:23	0294303696	00:03:43	.25

SERVICE 02-9363445

24/12/98	07:54:57	0298175558	00:02:49	.25
24/12/98	08:24:51	0299224333	00:02:16	.25
24/12/98	11:32:13	0299971022	00:04:04	.25
24/12/98	12:58:09	0292748119	00:00:51	.25
24/12/98	12:59:09	0299533028	00:01:01	.25
24/12/98	15:26:31	0299139160	00:04:15	.25
26/12/98	21:33:07	0299092643	00:00:21	.25
27/12/98	04:16:23	0299755145	00:03:25	.25
27/12/98	08:42:38	0292961555	00:07:05	.25
27/12/98	11:13:09	0293619000	00:02:07	.25
27/12/98	11:15:38	0293567400	00:01:09	.25
27/12/98	11:22:26	0293634703	00:02:55	.25
27/12/98	17:05:20	0293695545	00:01:04	.25
27/12/98	18:12:38	0298745656	00:01:19	.25
27/12/98	19:16:43	0294843575	00:01:53	.25
27/12/98	21:06:03	0293375350	00:01:03	.25
27/12/98	21:42:72	0292961622	00:00:39	.25
28/12/98	02:18:56	0295162763	00:00:03	.25
28/12/98	01:18:10	0295162763	00:00:03	.25
28/12/98	01:19:13	0299581982	00:00:48	.25
28/12/98	01:24:17	0299994105	00:00:55	.25
28/12/98	01:25:11	0299091904	00:00:45	.25
28/12/98	01:26:46	0299994105	00:00:16	.25
28/12/98	01:28:38	0294167794	00:01:01	.25
28/12/98	01:30:01	0299492886	00:00:45	.25
28/12/98	02:14:02	0299535999	00:05:58	.25
28/12/98	02:42:19	0299492886	00:01:57	.25
28/12/98	02:45:30	0299994105	00:00:45	.25
28/12/98	02:47:32	0299091904	00:00:50	.25
28/12/98	05:54:13	0299581982	00:02:19	.25
28/12/98	06:32:27	0293278052	00:00:58	.25
28/12/98	06:34:12	0299772323	00:00:22	.25
28/12/98	06:35:12	0299772323	00:01:00	.25
28/12/98	06:38:15	0294494178	00:00:33	.25
28/12/98	06:40:39	0299693942	00:00:25	.25
28/12/98	07:19:10	0299994105	00:00:44	.25
28/12/98	07:36:28	0299391482	00:00:06	.25
28/12/98	09:00:02	0299708184	00:00:23	.25
28/12/98	10:32:02	0299756517	00:00:27	.25
28/12/98	10:16:53	0298883415	00:00:37	.25
28/12/98	10:42:38	0293331209	00:00:09	.25
28/12/98	10:52:32	0299652282	00:02:11	.25
28/12/98	10:58:37	0293895579	00:02:06	.25
28/12/98	11:12:48	0298777036	00:02:54	.25
28/12/98	17:37:29	0299757256	00:02:35	.25
28/12/98	18:28:56	0299535899	00:00:46	.25

"F"

Bureau of Meteorology  
New South Wales Regional Office  
02 9296 1555

**SYDNEY - HOBART  
YACHT RACE 4 DAY OUTLOOK**  
26 -29 December 1998

ISSUED BY THE BUREAU OF METEOROLOGY, SYDNEY  
at 2.00pm on Friday the 25<sup>th</sup> of December 1998-12-25

26/12  
UPDATE

Saturday 26<sup>th</sup> of December 1998

**Synoptic Situation:** High near NZ, cold front moving through Victoria, expected to reach the South NSW coast in the evening and the Illawarra coast overnight.

**Forecast area:** Sydney to Illawarra Coast

**Wind:** N/NE winds 10/15 knots, freshening to 15/20 knots during the afternoon. S'ly winds 15/25 knots behind the change.

600

**Seas/Swell:** Seas 1 to 2m. Swell 1 to 1.5m.

**Weather:** Mainly fine, showers and thunderstorms with the change.

Sunday 27<sup>th</sup> of December 1998

600 NE 10

**Synoptic Situation:** Front moving through Sydney by early morning. High ridging to the south coast and possible low developing to the west of Tasmania

S. 15

**Forecast area:** Illawarra to Bass Strait

12  
150 SE 20

**Wind:** S/SE winds 15/20 knots.

**Weather:** Isolated shower NSW coast.

Monday 28<sup>th</sup> of December 1998

900 N 10

**Synoptic Situation:** High moving into the east Tasman Sea.

**Forecast area:** NSW South Coast to Tasmania

12 NE 15

**Wind:** Winds tending N/NE 10/15 knots NSW coast and N/NW 15/20 Bass Strait.

**Weather:** Fine

15 20

## SEARCH AND RESCUE PROBLEMS / ISSUES

(Collated following debrief held 1500 hrs 29/12/98.)

**Present:** H. Sommer, Sam Hughes, Howard Elliott, Phil Thompson, Mark Robinson, E Drolz

Please note the issues are not in order of priority.

### Next of Kin

- notification procedure
- NOK information needs to be checked for accuracy and include full name and relationship of NOK.

### Crew Lists

- include crew addresses
- two contact persons
- ensure contact persons have all crew NOK details

### Information

- accuracy and slowness of information forwarded to Race Centre
- lack of regular, consistent information from external agencies eg Eden Coastal Patrol

### Media Issues

- information being released from multiple sources eg AMSA
- reportage of inaccurate and premature information
- negative image of race management created by the perception of our lack of information as a result of the preceding points

### Communications

- secure / better communications channel to radio relay vessel
- Telstra Yachtcom access/usage
- radio reception not adequate
- position reporting system relies on too many variables

### Process / Procedure Issues

- no formal 'disaster' control plan / process for Race Control on place
- knowledge deficit of AMSA process
- lack of inclusion of CYC role in AMSA process
- 'missed sched' procedure – time delay considered lengthy
- standard operations procedure manual required for all centres

### Crew Procedure Issues

- Crews not following standard procedures such as listening watches (perceived) and 'missed sched' procedure

### Race Centre Issues

- ? too many - CYCA, Eden, Hobart
- difficulty controlling multiple centres
- deputy backup required for AMSA personnel
- more secure office environment required

### Eden Base

- Role clarification and duty statement required for personnel
- Formalised processes and procedures required

### Safety

- review personal safety equipment to include mandatory items such as inflatable floatation jackets and personal EPIRBs